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By far the most central and important question about laws of nature is this: Are 
they mere patterns in the phenomena (patterns that are in some way salient, to be 
sure—but still, nothing more than patterns)? Or are they something more, 
something that somehow governs or constrains those phenomena? Disagreement 
over this issue constitutes the Schism in contemporary philosophical work on laws of 
nature. Here, I will investigate the prospects for an important position that falls 
under the “mere patterns” approach: what, for reasons that will emerge, I call 
“Humean reductionism” about laws of nature. I will review the most prominent 
arguments against this position from the literature, and add some of my own that, I 
think, are more effective. All the same, “investigate” remains the operative word. 
The value of the various anti-Humean arguments lies not so much in their power to 
refute, as in their power to force a much sharper and more sophisticated articulation 
of a Humean position capable of resisting them. So, while I immodestly claim that 
my own anti-Humean arguments are the best out there, I offer them with only the 
modest aim of improving our understanding of the Schism. 
§1 Preliminaries 
I’m going to begin by assuming, without argument, a basic distinction between 
fundamental laws and the so-called “laws” of the special sciences. I will only be 
concerned with the former. It is the job of fundamental physics, and fundamental 
physics alone, to uncover the fundamental laws. These laws describe the way in 
which complete physical states of the world generate successive physical states—or, 
if you prefer, the way in which complete physical states are followed and preceded by 
complete physical states.1 I take it that the fundamental laws of our world fix a 
distinction between worlds that are nomologically possible, relative to our own, and 
worlds that are merely metaphysically possible. There is plenty of room for 
disagreement about how this fixing happens: you might analyze nomological 
possibility by saying that a world is nomologically possible relative to our own iff it 
has the same laws as our world; or you might say that it is nomologically possible iff 
what goes on in it merely conforms to the laws of our world; or you might hold that 
                                                
1 What is a complete physical state, in general relativity? It will do to let it be the complete physical 
state of one space-like hypersurface, treating the laws now as constraining how the rest of space-time 
can be, compatible with a specific state for some such hypersurface. 
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it is the relation of nomological possibility that has metaphysical priority, so that the 
locution “it is a law that P” is to be analyzed as “P is true in every nomologically 
possible world”. Mostly, these niceties won’t matter as we consider rival 
philosophical accounts of laws of nature in what follows; all that will matter is that 
an account somehow or other deliver the needed distinction between nomological 
possibility and impossibility. 
By fixing the structure of the nomological possibilities, the fundamental laws, 
together with facts about what actually happens, fix the counterfactual structure of 
our world: that is, they fix truth values for all counterfactuals that (1) have 
antecedents compatible with the fundamental laws, and (2) are determinate enough 
to have truth values.2 
By fixing the counterfactual structure of the world, the laws (again, together with 
the facts about what actually happens) fix all the facts about what causes what, and 
what causal dispositions are had by what. It is at this point that the special sciences 
get to have a say: for what they aim to discover are not laws in anything like the 
sense at work in fundamental physics, but rather “laws” that are really a certain kind 
of causal generalization (see for example Hall 2005). 
It will be useful to have an example of some fundamental laws, to turn to as a 
kind of test case for Humean reductionism. Current physics is too messy; so we will 
rewind about two centuries, and consider Newtonian particle mechanics. That is, we 
will assume that our world is wholly composed of some finite number of 
indestructible point-particles, moving in continuous trajectories through space, and 
each possessed of an unchanging value for mass and charge. As a first pass, we will 
take the fundamental laws governing these motions to be Newton’s laws of motion 
and the appropriate force laws. But that is just a rough guide, for we should 
remember that there are perfectly legitimate formulations of Newtonian point 
mechanics that make no mention of force—e.g., the Hamiltonian formulation. It is 
contentious to assume that these are formulations of a strictly different theory than 
Newton’s (e.g., because Newton’s theory is ontologically committed to forces, and 
the Hamiltonian formulation is not). What really matters for our purposes is that the 
laws of our world (as we are imagining it to be) pick out a range of nomologically 
possible total histories of particle behavior. And for that aim, any formulation will 
do. 
                                                
2In other words, we are not expecting the fundamental laws, even with the help of all the relevant 
historical facts, to settle such difficult issues as what exactly Caesar would have done, had he been in 
charge in Korea. 
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A very handy way to map this set of nomologically possible histories is as 
follows: We will suppose that the fundamental laws delimit a certain set of 
nomologically possible initial conditions, each of which is given by specifying the 
number of particles at the “initial time”, along with their masses, charges, positions, 
and velocities. (Of course, we do not need to be committed to the claim that there is 
an initial time. It will be enough to assume that the laws delimit a set of possible 
instantaneous physical states for the world as a whole to be in, at whatever time. But 
we will stick with the simplifying assumption that there is an initial time.) Second, the 
laws specify how each such initial condition would evolve forward in time. We can 
summarize by saying that the fundamental laws “factor” the set of nomologically 
possible histories of particle behavior into an initial conditions hypothesis (ICH) and 
a dynamical hypothesis (DH). 
Some comments. First, we will assume, in the case of our Newtonian example, 
that the dynamical hypothesis is deterministic, so that no two nomologically possible 
histories perfectly agree on particle behavior (i.e., on their distribution of particle 
positions, masses, and charges) up to some time without agreeing for all time. Later, 
we will occasionally tweak the example so as to relax this assumption.3 
Second, I said that ICH + DH yields the set of nomologically possible histories 
of particle behavior—not the set of nomologically possible worlds. One reason for 
holding back from the stronger characterization is that, according to most anti-
reductionists about laws of nature, more is needed to specify the nomologically 
possible worlds. Minimally, one needs to say that they are worlds that not only 
exhibit nomologically possible histories of particle behavior, but that are also 
governed by the same laws as the actual world. And that is a substantive addition—
one rejected by some (though not all) versions of Humean reductionism. 
Third, it is worth noting that the breadth of the ICH makes for a certain kind of 
strength. That is, it is, other things equal, a point in favor of a physical theory that it 
recognizes a wide range of nomologically possible initial conditions. To see why, 
compare for example Keplerian and Newtonian accounts of the solar system. 
Granted that the Newtonian account is much more empirically accurate, it is also, 
from the standpoint of scientific investigation, better in a distinct sense: for it allows 
us to answer questions not merely about how the elements of the solar system did, 
                                                
3Note that the assumption of determinism is in fact problematic, although not for reasons that will 
matter here. Xia 1992, for example, describes a fiendishly clever five-particle Newtonian world in 
which the five particles, solely as a result of gravitational forces, accelerate to infinity in finite time. 
Such a world is clearly not backwards deterministic, and time-reversibility of the dynamics shows that 
it is not forwards deterministic, either. So it is actually a somewhat delicate matter what extra 
constraints to impose on the ICH in order to get determinism. 
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do, and will behave, but also about how they would have behaved under alternative 
physical conditions. We will come back to the significance of this kind of strength 
later, in §6; we will see that the Humean reductionist has a very difficult time 
accounting for its importance in physical theorizing. 
§2 The Elements of  Humean Reductionism 
A standard way to set up Humean reductionism is as follows: First, one posits a 
basic distinction between modal and nonmodal facts about the world (or sometimes, 
between nomic and non-nomic facts). The core thesis of Humean reductionism is 
then stated as a supervenience claim: all facts—and in particular, all facts about the 
fundamental laws—supervene on the totality of nonmodal facts, so that no two 
worlds different with respect to their fundamental laws without differing somehow 
with respect to their nonmodal facts. Some authors lose their nerve, and treat this 
supervenience claim as itself contingent (more on this in a moment), saying only that 
among “worlds like ours”, no two differ with respect to their laws without differing 
with respect to their nonmodal facts. (Obviously, some criterion needs to be added 
for distinguishing which of the worlds are, in the relevant sense, like ours.) Whatever 
modal status is assigned to the supervenience claim, the aim then becomes to 
construct a philosophical account of laws that respects it. Given the widespread 
popularity of the supervenience claim, then, it comes as no surprise that the idea that 
laws are mere patterns in the phenomena should prove so attractive. 
I think, however, that this way of setting things up invites some confusion. First, 
supervenience is too weak a relation: just notice that it is not asymmetric, whereas 
reduction—which is clearly what is intended—is. Second, one might reasonably 
think that, if facts about laws reduce to nonmodal facts, then they must themselves be 
nonmodal facts. If so, the claim that facts about the laws reduce to the totality of 
nonmodal facts (which, being a totality, includes them) becomes trivial. Or, more 
carefully, to make the claim nontrivial requires a substantive, nontrivial 
characterization of the modal/nonmodal distinction. 
A third and quite distinct worry is this: Suppose you think that such magnitudes 
as mass and charge are ineluctably bound up with the laws, in the sense that nothing 
could count as mass unless it were governed by the law of universal gravitation, and 
likewise nothing could count as charge unless it were governed by Coulomb’s law. 
(We will henceforth label this position “essentialism”.) Then you will almost certainly 
hold that there could be no difference between two worlds with respect to the laws 
without some difference with respect to what fundamental physical magnitudes are 
instantiated in those worlds. Now, a Humean will quickly point out that your 
adherence to that supervenience thesis does not put you in his camp; for the 
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subvening facts in question—facts about the pattern of instantiation of fundamental 
physical magnitudes—are not, on your view, nonmodal facts. Maybe so, but again, it 
would be nice to have a characterization of the modal/nonmodal distinction 
substantive and clear enough to explain why it is so. 
So let me suggest a different way of proceeding. I am going to start with the 
assumption, widespread among reductionists and anti-reductionists alike, that there is 
such a thing as the fundamental ontological structure of the world: facts about the 
world to which all other facts reduce.4 What the reductionist ought to do is to put 
forth a specific doctrine about the nature of this fundamental ontological structure. 
Lewis was admirably clear on this point. Drawing inspiration from Hume, he took 
the fundamental ontological structure to consist in the pattern of instantiation by 
space-time points of perfectly natural monadic properties, together with the facts 
about the spatiotemporal relations among those points.5 He could then say that these 
facts are nonmodal in the precise sense that the metaphysical possibilities involving 
the perfectly natural properties and relations respect a principle of recombination, 
according to which, for any way of distributing perfectly natural properties and 
relations among particulars, there is a possible world in which they are so distributed. 
                                                
4 If you are at a loss as to what “reduce to” means, and find insufficiently illuminating the observation 
that it is a logically stronger relation than supervenience, then there is probably little that I can do to 
help you. But what little I can do is contained in the following observation: There is a characteristic 
kind of question we ask when doing applied metaphysics. “What is it for such-and-such a fact to 
obtain?” For example, we might ask, “What is it for something to persist through time?” A four-
dimensionalist will give one answer (it is for it to be composed of momentary time-slices, such that 
for each of the times in question, one of the constituent time-slices exists at that time); a three-
dimensionalist will give a different answer (it is for it to be “wholly present” at each moment at which 
it exists, whatever exactly that means). Or we might ask, “What is it for someone to act freely?” A 
typical compatibilist will say that it is for her actions to be caused in the right sort of way by internal 
psychological states (never mind whether those psychological states themselves have fully sufficient 
causes in the remote past); a typical incompatibilist will say that it is for her to exercise a kind of 
metaphysically primitive causal agency. I take it that a correct answer to a question of the form, “What 
is it for such-and-such a fact to obtain?” must display other facts to which the fact in question reduces. 
One can then repeat the question, targeting these other facts. (What is it for a time-slice to exist at a 
time? Answer: it is for the contemporaneous space-time points that constitute it to exist.) The 
fundamental ontological structure of the world is what one arrives at when these questions stop. To 
say that all other facts reduce to facts about this structure is to say that it is facts about this structure, 
and only about this structure, that figure in the ultimate answers to “what is it for” questions. 
5 Lewis was agnostic about whether some further story could be told about what it is for a space-time 
point to instantiate a perfectly natural monadic property (or for a pair of them to instantiate a 
perfectly natural relation, etc.). That is, even deeper ontological bedrock might be reached if this 
instantiation consists in the participation of the space-time point in an Armstrongian universal. (See 
Lewis 1983.) This issue will not matter to us here. He also granted—quite sensibly, since quantum 
mechanics teaches us otherwise—that it is a contingent matter whether the only perfectly natural 
relations are spatiotemporal relations. He had other, more regrettable, reasons for viewing his cherished 
thesis of Humean supervenience as contingent; more on this below. 
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(Such a principle is intended to capture the Humean idea that there are no necessary 
connections between distinct existences.) So an improved Humean reductionism 
about laws would be this: facts about the laws reduce to facts about the distribution 
of perfectly natural properties and relations. That’s much better. First, notice that, 
since the reductionist is no longer claiming merely that facts about laws reduce to the 
totality of nonmodal facts—but rather, reduce to some specified subset of those 
facts—his position avoids the charge of triviality. Second, because a substantive 
characterization of “nonmodal” is in play (in terms of the recombination thesis), it is 
perfectly clear why the essentialist’s position contradicts our reductionist’s position. 
(For example, our reductionist’s metaphysics says that there is a possible world 
containing just two massive particles, where these particles are accelerating away 
from each other; according to the essentialist this is strictly metaphysically 
impossible.) 
Still, there is need for one more amendment. For Lewis (and many others) view 
the fundamental ontological structure of the world through the lens of properties 
and relations. This is a mistake. Consider mass. Are we to suppose that having mass 
5 g and having mass 7 g are distinct, perfectly natural properties? If so, then there is 
serious trouble with the recombination thesis, for it seems a logical truth that if an 
object has mass 5 g, then it does not have mass 7 g. I think that what is wanted is a 
formulation of Lewis’s position not in terms of a theory of properties and relations, 
but in terms of a theory of magnitudes (which could be monadic, dyadic, etc.). One 
could then build modal constraints into the structure of the magnitudes—so that any 
given particular can have at most one value of a given magnitude—while respecting a 
more limited inter-magnitude principle of recombination, so that the value a 
particular has for one magnitude places no metaphysical constraints on its value for 
any distinct magnitude, or on any other particular’s value for any magnitude. Such a 
limited combinatorial principle would more than suffice to rule out the essentialist 
position. In sum, the Humean reductionist position ought to be the following: The 
fundamental ontological structure of the world is given by the distribution of 
perfectly natural magnitudes in it, where these magnitudes respect an inter-
magnitude principle of recombination. All other facts, including facts about the laws, 
reduce to these facts. Applied to our Newtonian particle world, the thesis is that the 
facts about its laws reduce to the facts, over all time, about the positions, masses, and 
charges of all the particles. 
There is one more tricky issue to wrestle with, which is the modal status of this 
reductionist claim, and its relation to the more typically cited supervenience thesis. 
Now, given the foregoing doctrines about what “fundamental ontological structure” 
amounts to, once you have specified the fundamental ontological structure of a 
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world, you get for free that all other facts about the world reduce to facts about it. 
(Otherwise it wouldn’t count as the fundamental ontological structure.) So the 
crucial issue is really whether the Humean reductionist should hold that it is a merely 
contingent future of our world that its fundamental ontological structure is given by 
the pattern of instantiation of a set of perfectly natural magnitudes that respect a 
limited principle of recombination. Lewis himself seemed to waffle on this point, for 
some bad reasons (having to do with a misguided response to Armstrong’s spinning 
sphere example; we will pass over this) that have led to a good deal of mischief in the 
literature (having to do with a certain challenge posed to Humean reductionist 
accounts of objective chance; we will touch on this later, in §5.5). Here, I am simply 
going to assert without much argument that the best position for the Humean to 
take is an uncompromising one, according to which it is metaphysically necessary 
that the fundamental ontological structure of the world meet the foregoing 
characterization. At the very least, the following concession would, it seems to me, 
be disastrous: “In our world, the fundamental ontological structure is given by the 
positions, masses, and charges of all particles at all times. So—again, in our world—it 
is these facts that somehow make it the case that the fundamental laws of nature are 
the Newtonian laws. But it could have been otherwise. That is, there is a possible 
world that exactly matches ours with respect to particle motions, masses, and 
charges, but in which it is a further, irreducible fact that the laws are whatever they 
are. (In fact, there are many such worlds. In some of them, the irreducible laws are 
Newtonian laws; in others they are something else altogether.)” It seems to me that 
the only possible motivation one could have for adopting that position is a 
completely misconceived desire to partially accommodate the anti-reductionist 
intuitions of one’s opponent. For example, she might insist, as evidence for her anti-
reductionism, that it is intuitively obvious (1) that there are possible worlds 
containing a single particle moving with constant velocity, and in which the laws are 
the Newtonian laws, and (2) that there are still other possible worlds containing a 
single particle moving with constant velocity, and in which the sole law is that all 
particles move with constant velocity. (That example comes up a lot, in 
conversation.) You might think you could mollify her by adopting the position just 
quoted. But of course, you won’t succeed, for she will turn right around and ask 
what epistemic right you have to assume that ours is not a world equipped with 
metaphysically primitive laws. All in all, a bad move: it seems to me that the vastly 
more sensible policy for the Humean is to forgo all attempts at conciliation. At any 
rate, this war of intuitions involves some further subtleties; we will come back to it in 
§5.1. 
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So now we have the core thesis of Humean reductionism: it is metaphysically 
necessary that facts about laws reduce to facts about the pattern of instantiation of 
perfectly natural magnitudes, magnitudes that respect a limited principle of 
recombination. There are two more theses to add to get a fuller characterization of 
the key elements of Humean reductionism. First is a commitment to the objectivity 
of laws. It is notoriously difficult to say, in general, what “objectivity” amounts to, 
but here I think we can make do with the following thought: According to the 
reductionist positions we will be considering, what it is for the fundamental laws to 
be such and such is not to be explained by appeal to psychological facts about 
humans. For example, what it is for the laws of our particle world to be the 
Newtonian laws is not for them to be treated in a certain way by practicing scientists. 
It is, rather, for it to be the case that the particle motions/masses/charges meet some 
(yet to be specified) condition, statable in nonpsychological terms. (By the end of the 
paper, we will see that the most interesting and defensible version of Humean 
reductionism allows for some erosion in this commitment to objectivity; see in 
particular §5.6.) Finally, we assume that the way that facts about laws reduce to the 
fundamental facts is nontrivial. More specifically, a successful reductionist account 
must make it the case that, for at least many possible worlds, the set of possible 
worlds that count as nomologically possible relative to them is neither so expansive 
as to include all possible worlds, nor so narrow as to include only the given world 
itself. We will, in particular, take it for granted that this constraint applies to our 
Newtonian particle world. 
So much for the basic framework. Let’s now work our way up to the most 
interesting reductionist accounts with a brief discussion of naïve regularity theories as 
a warm-up exercise. 
§3 The Naïve Regularity Theory  
The naïve regularity theory has been refuted so frequently and so thoroughly that 
we don’t need to spend much time on it. Still, I think we can learn some useful 
lessons by taking a bit of care to see why exactly it goes wrong. So let’s apply the 
account to our Newtonian particle world. 
The usual guiding idea is that a law is, or corresponds to, a true law-like sentence, 
where what makes a sentence law-like is that it is universal in form, and contains only 
appropriately qualitative non-logical vocabulary. Here I will add what seems clearly 
to be a friendly amendment, in the form of an additional constraint on the non-
logical vocabulary. So let’s consider a language (a first-order language, I suppose) 
whose non-logical vocabulary consists solely of expressions for describing positions, 
masses, and charges of particles at times. That restriction guarantees that the non
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logical vocabulary is appropriately qualitative, and also avoids the immediate 
embarrassment of letting true claims about tables, chairs, etc. count as fundamental 
laws of nature. Then, where Φ is a sentence of this language, we will say that it is a 
law that Φ iff Φ is true, and the prenex form of Φ begins with a universal quantifier 
(so that Φ expresses a regularity). 
Now for the problems. First, a minor one. Observe that if a sentence Φ is of the 
needed kind, then it is true not only in our world, but also in a world that contains 
novel physical magnitudes, not instantiated in our world. That is, our language seems 
to lack the resources to say that mass and charge are the only fundamental physical 
magnitudes there are. No matter; let us suppose that there is a straightforward way to 
augment the language so that it can express this claim.  
Now for the more serious problems. Let us try to figure out which possible 
worlds, individuated up to purely qualitative identity, are compatible with the laws of 
our world, as this theory would have them. First, on the reasonable assumption that 
a universally quantified sentence is automatically true in a world in which nothing 
exists6, it follows that that world will count as nomologically possible. We will come 
back to the significance of that observation in a moment. Next, it is quite easy to see 
that among the remaining nonempty worlds, a world w will count as nomologically 
possible iff it contains exactly the same number of particles as our world, and there is 
a one-one mapping between the particles of our world and the particles of w that 
preserves masses, charges, and positions at all times. This result is probably obvious, 
but just in case, here is how we can proceed: 
Observe that there is a sentence of our language, beginning with a universal 
quantifier, that says that for anything that exists, it is one of exactly N particles. The 
true one of these provides the “law” that guarantees that every nonempty 
nomologically possible world has the same number of particles as the actual world. 
Next, and letting N now be the actual number of particles, our language has the 
resources to define, for any time t, a predicate F that is satisfied by a particle at a time 
iff it is one of a set of exactly N particles that has exactly the configuration of 
masses, charges, and positions exhibited by all the particles at time t.7 Letting F and 
                                                
6 Reasonable, even though it goes against the assumption usual in logic textbooks, that a first-order 
language must have a nonempty domain. I have no problem disagreeing with the textbooks here, 
since it seems to me silly to suppose that the claim that something exists is a logical truth. 
7 I have tacitly assumed here that our language has names for every real number (and so, unlike the 
first-order languages we are used to, has an uncountable non-logical vocabulary). I do not consider 
that assumption problematic. But in case you’re worried, it is not necessary: if we give our language 
only the ability to name every rational number, we will still get the result in the text, that the only 
nonempty nomologically possible world (up to qualitative identity) is the actual world. I leave it as a 
fairly easy exercise to demonstrate this result. 
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G be two predicates of this type, the set of true sentences of the form “for all x, if x 
is F at t, then x is G at t’” will pin down the trajectories of our N particles exactly. 
So, if we ignore the metaphysical view that holds that two possible worlds can differ 
with respect to what is true at them without differing in any qualitative respect, the 
upshot is that the only two possible worlds compatible with the laws of our world 
are the empty world, and our world itself. 
That is embarrassing for two distinct reasons. The first, obviously, is that the set 
of nomologically possible worlds is much too small—it should have uncountably 
many more members than it does. But the second, interestingly, is that it is also in 
one respect too big: for we might want it to fail to include the empty world. Suppose, 
for example, that we thought that Newton was right in holding that absolute space 
exists. Presumably, it was part of Newton’s intent in postulating absolute space that 
its existence is a non-accidental feature of our world. (It is not as if Newton thought 
that, as it happens, there is absolute space; but that it could, compatible with the 
fundamental physical laws, easily have been otherwise.) If so, then every 
nomologically possible world ought to include as one part absolute space. Now, as it 
stands, we didn’t give our language the expressive resources to talk about absolute 
space. But that was a minor oversight, and the point is that rectifying it would not 
have changed the verdict that the empty world—which lacks, among other things, 
absolute space—is one compatible with the laws of our world, and so nomologically 
possible. 
So there are really two lessons to learn here from the failure of the naïve 
regularity theory. The first is that it falls apart not for the reasons usually cited—its 
inability to deal appropriately with vacuous laws, etc.—but simply because it fails to 
draw a nontrivial distinction between what is nomologically possible and what is 
nomologically impossible. The second is that it puts an illegitimate emphasis on 
regularities. As the example of absolute space shows, there is no particular reason to 
think that existential claims are intrinsically ill-suited to characterizing what is in 
common to the set of nomologically possible worlds. That observation will lead 
naturally to a friendly amendment to the vastly more interesting and sophisticated 
reductionist account we will take up next. 
§4 The Best System Account: An Overview 
Lewis, citing inspiration from Mill and Ramsey, famously put forward what he 
took to be an improved regularity account. For the reasons noted at the end of the 
last section, I think the label “regularity account” is inapt. Still, he was 
unquestionably correct that the account vastly improves on its predecessors. There 
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are, I think, two distinct guiding ideas behind this account: the one that typically gets 
official mention, and a second one working behind the scenes. 
The official idea is that the laws are, or correspond to, true statements that 
collectively encode, in a highly efficient manner, a large amount of information about 
the world. The unofficial position is a kind of “ideal observer” view, according to 
which the fundamental laws are whatever a suitably placed observer, implementing 
the best scientific standards for judging what laws are, would take them to be. I will 
consider these two ideas in turn, and then highlight an obvious way in which we 
might think to reconcile them. (By the end of the paper, we will see the prospects for 
a reconciliation dim substantially.) 
§4.1. The official guiding idea 
First the official idea. Here is a classic statement from Lewis: 
 
Certainly not just any regularity is a law of nature. Some are accidental. So an adequate 
regularity analysis must be selective. Also, an adequate analysis must be collective. It must 
treat regularities not one at a time, but rather as candidates to enter into integrated systems. 
For a given regularity might hold either as a law or accidentally, depending on whether other 
regularities obtain that can fit together with it in a suitable system. (Thus I reject the idea that 
lawhood consists of ‘lawlikeness’ plus truth.) Following Mill and Ramsey, I take a suitable 
system to be one that has the virtues we aspire to in our own theory-building, and that has 
them to the greatest extent possible given the way the world is. It must be entirely true; it 
must be closed under strict implication; it must be as simple in axiomatisation as it can be 
without sacrificing too much information content; and it must have as much information 
content as it can have without sacrificing too much simplicity. A law is any regularity that 
earns inclusion in the ideal system. (Or, in case of ties, in every ideal system.) The ideal 
system need not consist entirely of regularities; particular facts may gain entry if they 
contribute enough to collective simplicity and strength. (For instance, certain particular facts 
about the Big Bang might be strong candidates.) But only the regularities of the system are to 
count as laws. 
We face an obvious problem. Different ways to express the same content, using 
different vocabulary, will differ in simplicity. The problem can be put in two ways, 
depending on whether we take our systems as consisting of propositions (classes of worlds) 
or as consisting of interpreted sentences. In the first case, the problem is that a single system 
has different degrees of simplicity relative to different linguistic formulations. In the second 
case, the problem is that equivalent systems, strictly implying the very same regularities, may 
differ in their simplicity. In fact, the content of any system whatever may be formulated very 
simply indeed. Given system S, let F be a predicate that applies to all and only things at 
worlds where S holds. Take F as primitive, and axiomatise S (or an equivalent thereof) by the 
single axiom ∀xFx. If utter simplicity is so easily attained, the ideal theory may as well be as 
strong as possible. Simplicity and strength needn’t be traded off. Then the ideal theory will 
include (its simple axiom will strictly imply) all truths, and a fortiori all regularities. Then, after 
all, every regularity will be a law. That must be wrong.  
The remedy, of course, is not to tolerate such a perverse choice of primitive vocabulary. 
We should ask how candidate systems compare in simplicity when each is formulated in the 
simplest eligible way; or, if we count different formulations as different systems, we should 
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dismiss the ineligible ones from candidacy. An appropriate standard of eligibility is not far to 
seek: let the primitive vocabulary that appears in the axioms refer only to perfectly natural 
properties.  (Lewis 1983, pp. 41-2) 
 
Lewis’s formulation here of what we will henceforth call the Best System 
Account (BSA) needs some amendments. But first, I want to make sure that we 
don’t lose sight of the overarching idea. Lewis takes it that there is some canonical 
scheme for representing facts about the world. Then any correct representation that 
makes use of this scheme will have two features: First, it will have a degree of 
informativeness, determined purely by which possible worlds the representation rules 
out. So it automatically follows that if one correct representation rules out more 
possible worlds than a second (i.e., every world in which the second true is one in 
which the first is true, but not vice versa), then the first is more informative. There 
are thus maximally informative representations, made so by being true only in the 
actual world. Second, it will have a degree of simplicity, determined by broadly 
syntactic features of the representation (“broadly”, because we want to leave it open 
whether the canonical scheme of representation is linguistic; more on this shortly). 
These two factors of simplicity and informativeness then determine an ordering—
presumably, partial—among all the correct representations there are, in terms of how 
well each one balances simplicity and informativeness. Lewis’s hope is that the nature 
of our world will yield a clear winner: 
 
The worst problem about the best-system analysis is that when we ask where the 
standards of simplicity and strength and balance come from, the answer may seem to be that 
they come from us. Now, some ratbag idealist might say that if we don’t like the misfortunes 
that the laws of nature visit upon us, we can change the laws—in fact, we can make them 
always have been different—just by changing the way we think! (Talk about the power of 
positive thinking.) It would be very bad if my analysis endorsed such lunacy. I used to think 
rigidification came to the rescue: in talking about what the laws would be if we changed our 
thinking, we use not our hypothetical new standards of simplicity and strength and balance, 
but rather our actual and present standards. But now I think that is a cosmetic remedy only. 
It doesn’t make the problem go away, it only makes it harder to state. 
The real answer likes elsewhere: if nature is kind to us, the problem needn’t arise. I 
suppose our standards of simplicity and strength and balance are only partly a matter of 
psychology. It’s not because of how we happen to think that a linear function is simpler than 
a quartic or a step function; it’s not because of how we happen to think that a shorter 
alternation of prenex quantifiers is simpler than a longer one; and so on. Maybe some of the 
exchange rates between aspects of simplicity, etc., are a psychological matter, but not just 
anything goes. If nature is kind, the best system will be robustly best—so far ahead of its rivals 
that it will come out first under any standards of simplicity and strength and balance. We 
have no guarantee that nature is kind in this way, but no evidence that it isn’t. It’s a 
reasonable hope. Perhaps we presuppose it in our thinking about law. (Lewis 1994, p. 479) 
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This passage raises an issue—that the BSA might fail to guarantee that facts 
about the fundamental laws are objective—that we will have to come back to later. 
For now, just take note of the big picture: According to the BSA, laws are regularities 
entailed by that candidate system (read: correct representation of the world that 
makes use of the canonical scheme of representation) that achieves the best balance 
of simplicity and informativeness. 
§4.2. Some amendments 
Now for the amendments (some of them: §6 will introduce a final and important 
one). First, for reasons already noted, I think it was a mistake for Lewis to insist that 
laws must be regularities. I would therefore simplify the account by omitting this 
requirement, and presenting the account as, in the first instance, a theory of 
nomological possibility: the nomologically possible worlds are exactly those in which 
the best system is true. So, if the best system includes the claim that there is absolute 
space, then it is nomologically necessary that there is absolute space. “It is a law that 
A” will then be true iff A is true in every nomologically possible world—never mind 
if A is not explicitly included in the best system for our world.  
Two comments. First, in refashioning the BSA as a theory of nomological 
possibility—as opposed to a theory of laws, which can subsequently be used to 
define nomological possibility—we do lose a bit of grain. That is, one might hold the 
view that even once we have specified which worlds are nomologically possible, it is 
a further question what the laws are that underlie these nomological possibilities. For 
example, one might think that there is a real question which formulation of 
Newtonian mechanics accurately expresses its laws—even when rival formulations 
generate exactly the same set of nomological possibilities. Or, one might find it 
embarrassing that if it is a law that P, then it is also a law that (P or Q), for any 
proposition Q, no matter how irrelevant.  
This strikes me as a non-issue. As far as I can tell, the purposes for which we need 
a notion of fundamental law—most notably, to fix a counterfactual structure for the 
world, and thereby fix facts about causation, etc.—require no such finer resolution; a 
mere distinction between what is nomologically possible and what is not will suffice.  
Second, the first quoted passage from Lewis did seem to suggest that he had a 
specific reason for wanting to restrict laws to regularities, presumably because he did 
not want the hinted at facts (existential facts?) about the Big Bang to count as laws. I 
confess, though, that I really have no idea what was worrying him. It is certainly true, 
as we will see in §5.5, that some modern defenders of the BSA (Barry Loewer and 
David Albert in particular) think the best system should include fairly substantive 
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claims about the initial conditions of our world. But they are quite happy to give 
these claims the status of laws, even though they don’t take the form of regularities. 
Next, Lewis’s conception of the canonical scheme of representation is probably 
wrongheaded. He seems to think that it should be a first-order language, whose 
nonlogical vocabulary expresses natural properties and relations. But physics doesn’t 
talk the language of properties and relations; as already noted, it talks the language of 
magnitudes—magnitudes most naturally represented by mathematical and not linguistic 
entities. An adequate scheme of representation should pay heed to this practice. 
Sticking to first-order logic, we could of course talk about masses and charges by 
means of such predicates as “— has mass —”. But then we will need to add extra, 
nonlogical axioms, stating that nothing can have more than one mass, that mass 
values must be non-negative real numbers, etc. These axioms will inevitably add to 
the syntactic complexity of the candidate system that employs them; but it seems 
quite unfair to charge a system for such added complexity. (Remember that the 
virtues exhibited by the best system are supposed to mirror the virtues we see in 
scientific theorizing. Are we really to suppose that a scientific theory automatically 
loses points for describing the world in terms of mathematically structured 
magnitudes, rather than unstructured properties and relations?)  
Second, the standard way that contemporary physical theories delimit the class of 
nomological possibilities is by means of mathematical models, typically defined in 
part by differential equations. So why not let the canonical scheme of representation 
simply be such models, or rather the equations that define them? There would still, 
unquestionably, be a role for the distinction between natural physical magnitudes and 
gerrymandered ones. For example, we could require that the variables that appear in 
a set of defining equations correspond only to genuine (i.e. perfectly natural) physical 
magnitudes.  
At any rate, I think we can leave for another day the question of how best to 
work out this alternative account of the canonical scheme of representation. It is 
quite clear that pursuing it would do nothing to threaten the spirit of Lewis’s 
proposal (and would probably go a long way towards improving its lettering). 
Let’s briefly consider how the BSA (as I have partially reconceived it) would 
apply to our Newtonian particle world. The basic idea is that we want to capture as 
much information as we can about the motions, masses, and charges of particles by 
exhibiting equations that particle behavior must conform to. If we were allowed to 
invent any old magnitude we wished, allowing a parameter representing it into our 
equations, then this would be easy: define a “magnitude” M that is stipulated to have 
value 1 for a particle exactly if that particle belongs to a world of particles whose 
behaviors are just what they actually are. But if we require that the parameters that 
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appear in the equations correspond to natural magnitudes—i.e., position, mass, and 
charge—then presumably things aren’t so easy. It is not all implausible that the 
equations that appear in Newtonian mechanics (in, say, its Hamiltonian formulation) 
achieve, among all such candidate equations, far and away the best balance of 
simplicity and informativeness. 
§4.3. The unofficial guiding idea 
So much for the first guiding idea. The second is, in fact, already hinted at in the 
first of the passages quoted from Lewis. Here it is again: “…I take a suitable system 
to be one that has the virtues we aspire to in our own theory-building, and that has 
them to the greatest extent possible given the way the world is.” Elsewhere, he is 
even more explicit: “The standards of simplicity, of strength, and of balance between 
them are to be those that guide us in assessing the credibility of rival hypotheses as 
to what the laws are.” (Lewis 1986, p. 123) 
To help flesh this idea out more fully, let us imagine someone whom I will call a 
Limited Oracular Perfect Physicist. What makes our LOPP a perfect physicist is that, 
given as evidence any information about the world, she is perfectly able to judge 
what hypotheses about the fundamental physical laws are most strongly supported 
by that evidence. What makes her oracular is that she has, as evidence, quite a lot of 
information about the world. But not, of course, all information: else her job would 
be too easy. (For example, she doesn’t directly receive as evidence information about 
what the fundamental laws are.) Specifically, we will suppose that what she has 
available to her as evidence are all the facts about the distribution of perfectly natural 
magnitudes. In the case of our Newtonian particle world, her evidence consists in 
perfect information about the motions, masses, and charges of every particle, 
together with the further information that the world contains nothing else. The 
second guiding idea, then, is roughly that the laws are whatever she says they are. 
Some comments. First, and most obviously, the device of introducing a fictional 
LOPP is dispensable. What the second guiding idea really needs to assume is that 
there are, implicit in the practice of physics, evidential standards for determining 
what the fundamental physical laws are that induce a mapping from possible worlds 
to something like a probability distribution (or perhaps a family of such distributions) 
over propositions about the fundamental laws of nature. It is nothing more than a 
useful heuristic to imagine a creature who holds that mapping in her head. Next—
and this is quite important—it is no part of anti-reductionism per se that it must 
reject the existence of such a mapping. That is, an anti-reductionist can—and 
should—perfectly agree that there is a fact of the matter about how one’s credence 
over alternative hypotheses about the fundamental laws of nature ought to be 
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distributed, were one fully apprised of the positions, masses, and charges of every 
particle at every time. (In the case of our well-behaved Newtonian world, the anti-
reductionist presumably will say that one ought to be all but certain that the laws are 
the Newtonian laws.) But the anti-reductionist will view this as a purely epistemic fact 
of the matter. So we can summarize the second guiding idea this way: the Humean 
reductionist is taking standards that both sides endorse—but that his anti-reductionist 
opponent views as solely epistemic standards—and elevating them to the status of 
standards that are constitutive of laws of nature. 
There are two subtleties that we need to take note of. They have the same 
source, which is that it is not legitimate for our Humean reductionist to assume that 
the epistemic standards implicit in the best practice of physics have a built-in bias 
toward his metaphysical position about laws. In fact, what makes the most dialectical 
sense is for him to assume the opposite (and, for reasons that we will get to later, this 
assumption is independently plausible). He will then simply need to compensate—
with luck, only slightly—for this anti-reductionist bias. Let me explain. 
Imagine that we are reductionists, and that we are interviewing our LOPP. She 
has been informed of the complete history of particle motions, masses, and charges, 
and has formed in response an opinion about what the laws are, hence which worlds 
are nomologically possible. We ask her to tell us which worlds these are. She tells us 
that since, of course, facts about laws do not reduce to nonmodal facts, in order to 
tell us which worlds are nomologically possible she must tell us two things: she must 
tell us, for each nomologically possible world, what its history of particle behavior is, 
and she must also tell us what its laws are. Never mind that, according to her, the 
second part is easy, since it is nomologically impossible for the laws to be other than 
they actually are. We are, all the same, distressed. For she is not giving us exactly the 
information we want—indeed, she is giving us “information” (namely, about 
metaphysically irreducible laws) that we think does not exist. So we rewind, and ask 
our question more carefully: “Please, oh LOPP, tell us which worlds, described up to 
but not beyond their nonmodal features, are nomologically possible.” We need not 
worry that her answer to that question will presuppose anything objectionable. The 
moral—and admittedly, it is a fairly minor one—is that our slogan formulation of the 
second idea went slightly awry. We should have said that the Humean reductionist 
takes epistemic standards for determining the nomological possibilities for the nonmodal facts—
standards that both he and his opponent endorse as such—and promotes them to 
the status of standards that are constitutive of the nomological possibilities for the 
nonmodal facts. (The reductionist then adds, of course, that these are all the facts.) 
The second way in which the reductionist must compensate for an anti-
reductionist element in the LOPP’s standards is a bit more subtle. I will postpone 
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discussion of it until §4.5. Let us first take advantage of the second guiding idea in 
providing a fairly user-friendly explanation of the Humean’s treatment of objective 
chance.  
§4.4. The treatment of objective chance 
We need a new example. I will borrow one that I’ve used before, for a different 
purpose (see Hall 2004). 
Imagine a particle world that is almost like our Newtonian world, with one 
significant exception: The behavior of its particles conforms exactly to Newton’s 
laws of motion and the relevant force laws, except that whenever two particles 
collide, they either rebound in a perfectly elastic collision, or stick together in a 
perfectly inelastic collision (forming, let us say, a particle whose mass and charge are 
the sums of the masses and charges of the colliding particles). We would like to add 
to this description that there is, for each collision, some objective chance of each 
outcome; but the reductionist can say no such thing at the outset. For, according to 
him, such facts do not belong to that elite set of facts to which all other facts about a 
world reduce.8 So we must proceed with our description of this world in a more 
roundabout way. Let us therefore stipulate, first, that an absolutely enormous (but 
finite) number of collisions takes place, and second, that the frequencies of the two 
types of outcome (elastic vs. inelastic collision) show no dependency on any of the 
physical parameters that characterize the collisions: no dependency on the intrinsic 
physical parameters of the colliding particles, and no dependency on their relative 
velocities, accelerations, etc. 
What do I mean, “no dependency”? We need to be careful here. Of course there 
will be some function that takes complete specifications of these parameters as input 
and outputs a real number that correctly describes the frequency of elastic outcomes 
among collisions with those values of the parameters. (Given that many 
combinations of values are never realized in this world, then there will be infinitely 
many such functions.) The point is that by the reductionist’s lights, this function will 
be far too complicated to deserve to be included as part of the fundamental laws of this 
world. 
We can get a firmer purchase on how the reductionist introduces facts about 
chances to this world by considering what our LOPP will conclude, when given 
complete information about how particles in this world behave. To begin, she will 
surely give the lion’s share of her credence to a certain kind of probabilistic 
                                                
8 So I am setting aside here the possibility of a Humean reductionist view that treats objective chances 
as among the perfectly natural magnitudes. For good reasons to set this possibility aside, see for 
example Ismael 1996. 
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hypothesis, according to which each interaction has the same single-case chance of 
yielding a given outcome, where these objective probabilities are independent of one 
another. But it is just as clear that she will not settle on a unique value for this single-
case chance. Rather, she will have a credence distribution over a range of values from 
0 to 1 (exclusive), sharply peaked around the value that is equal to the actual relative 
frequency. Presumably, what the reductionist would like to do in this case is to 
“round off”, and insist that the proper metaphysical conclusion to draw is that the 
single-case chance just is the relative frequency, since this is the value on which her 
credence distribution peaks. 
We will come back, in the next section, to a lingering problem about this 
“rounding off” maneuver. For now, I wish to draw attention to something else. Our 
LOPP takes as evidence facts about particle motions, masses, and charges—but not 
about chances. She outputs a choice of a “best” (i.e., most probable) hypothesis, which 
inter alia is a hypothesis about chances. Now, we are assuming that she is the kind of 
anti-reductionist who invests in the notion of “chance” a content that no 
reductionist could give it (since, most obviously, perfect knowledge of the nonmodal 
facts leaves her with residual uncertainty about what the chances are). No matter: 
since we are assuming that she perfectly implements the very best scientific criteria 
for theory choice, we can read off of her choice for “best” theory for a given world a 
way to fix, in a well-motivated and reductionist-friendly fashion, facts about chances 
for that world. In general, the claim “cht(A) = x” (read: the chance, at time t, that the 
proposition A will come true, is x) is true at world w iff the theory that the LOPP 
would choose as best if given as evidence the totality of fundamental, nonmodal 
facts about w, when applied to the time t state of w, yields the conclusion that cht(A) 
= x.9 More simply: “cht(A) = x” is true iff a suitably informed LOPP says it’s true 
(really: most likely to be true). Less simply, but more illuminatingly: What it is for a 
claim of the form “cht(A) = x” to be true is for the fundamental, nonmodal facts of 
the world to be such that they would lead a LOPP informed of them to conclude 
that this claim was (most likely to be) true. 
What remains is for the BSA to supply a specific hypothesis about what the 
standards are upon which our LOPP relies. Lewis adds, to the usual standards of 
simplicity and informativeness, a standard of statistical fit, measured by how likely a 
probabilistic candidate system judges the actual history of the world to be. That may 
not be the best choice; see for example Elga (2004). But worries about it are, I think, 
comparatively superficial: for notice that they do not threaten the unofficial guiding 
                                                
9 I’m assuming as a necessary truth that chances behave in a Markovian fashion. We can relax this 
assumption by letting the best theory be applied to the entire history of w up to t. 
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idea, but only one specific way of fleshing it out (i.e., one specific proposal about 
what the relevant and implicit standards for theory choice are).  
Time to return to our unfinished business: what should a reductionist say, when 
the evidence available to our LOPP leaves her undecided as to what the laws are? 
§4.5. A problem with “rounding off” 
Observe that, even when our LOPP is given complete information about our 
Newtonian particle histories, it is plausible that she will reserve some share of 
credence, however tiny, for hypotheses about the fundamental laws according to 
which they are not the Newtonian laws, but something else—something that, 
presumably by some remarkable coincidence, happens to conspire with the initial 
conditions of our world to make it look as if it is a Newtonian world. So the 
reductionist will need to perform a “rounding off” maneuver—in this case, taking 
the nomological possibilities to be given by that hypothesis to which the LOPP 
accords the highest share of credence. Let’s explore this issue further, for it does, 
alas, contain a potentially serious problem for the reductionist, which I have only the 
beginnings of an idea how to solve. 
It obviously won’t do for our reductionist to say that, when the LOPP fails to 
assign a credence of 1 to some law-hypothesis, the proper metaphysical conclusion 
to draw is that it is indeterminate what the laws are, with the range of indeterminacy 
running over those hypotheses to which she assigns credence greater than 0. At the 
same time it will, by the reductionist’s lights, sometimes be indeterminate what the laws 
are. So perhaps he should say that, provided the LOPP assigns a credence 
sufficiently above 0.5 to some hypothesis, it is a determinate fact that the 
nomological possibilities are specified by that hypothesis. 
That might work, as far as it goes. But it doesn’t go far enough, as our discussion 
of the chancy Newtonian world already demonstrated. There, we saw that our LOPP 
would end up assigning a credence distribution over a continuous range of hypotheses 
(and so: at most infinitesimal credence, to any specific one of them). And what the 
reductionist would nevertheless like to claim, about that case, is that there is a 
determinate fact about the probabilistic laws, given by that hypothesis on which the 
LOPP’s credence peaks.  
But there will be other, structurally similar cases in which the reductionist will 
want to claim that there is some objective indeterminacy in the laws. To see this, let us 
complicate our chancy Newtonian example, and imagine that the phenomena 
support a functional version of a probabilistic law, as follows: This time, the 
frequencies of the two types of outcome do show a simple dependency on the 
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physical parameters that characterize the collisions. Specifically, they conform very 
closely to the following equation:  
 
frequency of elastic outcomes = e-kM,  
 
where M is equal to the sum of the masses of the colliding particles and k is some 
constant. 
So far, there is no new problem—though it will presumably still be the case that 
our LOPP distributes her credence over a range of possible values for k. Now for a 
devious twist. Suppose that there is some other way in which to parameterize the 
collisions—say, by the combined charges of the incoming particles C—that gives rise 
to frequency data that is just as simple, but that yields a different and incompatible 
probabilistic law—say, this one: 
 
frequency of elastic outcomes = e-k*C,  
 
where k* is some different constant. And by “incompatible”, I mean really 
incompatible: for many and perhaps all collisions, the two laws assign substantially 
different single-case chances. However much we might indulge in pious Lewisian 
hopes that our world is not so ill-behaved, it is, by the reductionist’s lights, 
unquestionably metaphysically possible for one to behave in this way.  
What a reductionist should say about such a world is that it is indeterminate what 
its probabilistic laws are. The question—which I am going to have to leave mostly 
open—is how to construct a detailed theory that says that we have indeterminacy in 
this case, but not in the first case examined above (the case of our simple chancy 
Newtonian world). For what it’s worth, my guess is that the best strategy for the 
reductionist is to say that in a case like this, the implicit standards that both he and 
his opponent endorse would themselves recognize a case of indeterminacy. That is, our 
LOPP would respond to this data not by dividing her credence more or less equally 
between the two probabilistic laws, but rather by insisting that, as an epistemic 
matter, there is no determinate fact about what one’s credences ought to be in this 
case. That verdict seems to me intuitively very plausible—after all, the data are utterly 
bizarre—but the matter deserves more consideration than I can give it here. 
§4.6. Reconciling the two guiding ideas 
So we have two, apparently distinct, guiding ideas. I will close this section by 
highlighting the obvious way to try to knit them together. Take the second guiding 
idea—that the implicit standards for judging lawhood are in fact constitutive of 
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lawhood—to be the central, nonnegotiable idea. Take the first idea—that lawhood is 
a matter of balancing simplicity and informativeness (and perhaps fit, in the case of 
probabilistic systems)—to be a substantive proposal about the nature of these 
implicit standards. Put another way, the “candidate systems” that the first guiding 
idea talks about can be thought of as constituting the range of hypotheses that our 
LOPP considers. She employs some criteria for ranking them in terms of plausibility, 
and what the first guiding idea tries to do is to say explicitly what those criteria are.  
Later on I will cast doubt on whether this reconciliation will really work. But for 
now it will be very useful to keep in mind when reviewing challenges to the BSA, for 
it will be important to distinguish those challenges that target the reductionist’s 
specific proposal to analyze laws in terms of simplicity and informativeness, from 
those that target the underlying idea that the practices implicit in physics for judging 
lawhood can be used to tell us what laws are. 
The next section takes up a long menu of challenges to the BSA. Most of them 
can, I will argue, be met rather handily; but the last of them will require a substantial 
revision to that account, presented in §6. This revision leads in turn, I think, to a very 
serious dilemma for the Humean reductionist. I will close in §7 with some 
speculative remarks about how the Humean might best overcome this dilemma. 
§5 A menu of  challenges to the BSA 
§5.1. The central anti-Humean intuition 
The simplest and most direct way to argue against reductionism is by way of the 
following kind of thought experiment: Imagine a world with a single particle, moving 
with constant velocity. There at least two possibilities—each, so this argument would 
have it, a genuine metaphysical possibility. The first is that this particle’s motion is 
governed by a law that says that all particles move with constant velocity. The second 
is that the motion is governed by the Newtonian laws. A possible world of the first 
type perfectly duplicates a possible world of the second type with respect to its 
nonmodal facts, even though the laws of these worlds are different. So facts about 
laws do not reduce to nonmodal facts. 
For some philosophers, the game is over at this point. For, they will claim, there 
is an a priori connection between what is conceivable and what is metaphysically 
possible, and thanks to this connection the thought experiment establishes that there 
are two possible worlds differing in their laws, but not in their nonmodal facts. But 
there is no such a priori connection—at least, not one nearly so direct enough to do 
the work needed of it here. My reasons for saying this are not the usual Kripkean 
ones (which, arguably, would not apply in a case like this anyway). Rather, I’m 
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impressed by the existence of many debates in fundamental ontology, each of which 
would lead to paradox, if this modal rationalist thesis of an a priori connection 
between the conceivable and the possible were correct. For example, a presentist 
holds that the only things that exist (tenselessly speaking) are things that exist now; 
an eternalist denies this claim. All parties agree that they are disputing a necessary 
truth: it’s not that there are some genuinely metaphysically possible worlds in which 
presentism is true, and others in which eternalism is true. At the same time, each 
position is conceivable. (Never mind that a typical eternalist will all too frequently 
deny that presentism is conceivable, and vice versa: this is just the kind of rhetorical 
posturing that one comes to expect from philosophers, when knock-down 
arguments aren’t available.) We could multiply examples: think of debates about the 
existence of God, or about the nature of persistence through time, or about 
unrestricted composition, etc. The proper verdict is that there is no quick route from 
judgments of conceivability to conclusions about the nature of fundamental 
ontology.10 
All the same, while it would be appropriate for the reductionist to deny that the 
foregoing thought experiment refutes his position, it would not be appropriate for 
him to wholly ignore the intuitions that drive it. Now, I think that there is a perfectly 
good response that a reductionist can make to this kind of thought experiment. But 
first, three bad responses:  
To begin, a reductionist might grant that these are genuine possible worlds, but 
insist that in our world, facts about fundamental laws do reduce to the nonmodal 
facts about how perfectly natural magnitudes are distributed. We have already 
considered and rejected this option (in §2).  
Second, some reductionists (e.g. Loewer 1996 and Beebee 2000) claim that much 
or all of the appeal of such thought experiments derives from the lingering influence 
of a wholly misconceived view of laws as the dictates of a divine lawmaker. This is a 
curious claim. Never mind that hard-headed anti-reductionists introspect no such 
influence. What is unclear is how the diagnosis could possibly be relevant, even if 
such influence were present. To see this, it is worth noticing that there is nothing in a 
divine command account of laws that would prevent a Humean reductionist from 
endorsing it. Here, for example, is how a BSA-friendly divine command account 
                                                
10 Chalmers—probably the most visible contemporary defender of modal rationalism—would, I take 
it, insist that the conceivability-possibility connection holds, provided that the judgments of 
conceivability are suitably ideal; see for example his 2002. I doubt that he’s right about this, but at any 
rate it hardly matters: there is enough controversy about the status of the anti-reductionist 
conceivability judgments at work in the thought experiment that no one could plausibly claim that 
they are “ideal”, in the relevant sense. 
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would go: Among the fundamental, nonmodal facts about the world are the fact that 
God exists, and has various intentions regarding the behavior of the physical parts of 
the world. Among the rest of the fundamental, nonmodal facts are facts that make it 
the case that the physical world happens to conform to these intentions. So, 
plausibly, a maximally simple and informative description of the world will include a 
claim that the natural portions of it conform in their behavior to God’s intentions. 
So this fact will, according to the BSA, be nomologically necessary. Its nomological 
necessity will underwrite such counterfactuals as this: If God had had such-and-such 
different intentions, the natural world would have behaved in a correspondingly 
different way. And it is in virtue of the truth of such counterfactuals that it is true to 
say that things in the natural world behave the way they do because God so intends it. 
In short, you could be a thoroughgoing Humean reductionist and still think that God 
pushes things in the natural world around. 
Presumably, a typical divine command theorist does not have this conception of 
her position, but rather has a conception according to which it conflicts with Humean 
reductionism. But that is because she has, as part of her antecedently available conceptual 
repertoire, the resources to characterize her divine command theory in the intended 
(i.e., anti-reductionist) manner. Specifically, she has a conception of power according 
to which whether something (in this case, God) has it is not a fact that reduces to the 
totality of nonmodal facts. Equipped with such a conception, she can formulate her 
preferred divine command theory. And she could just as well have formulated any of 
a number of distinct, and decidedly secular, anti-reductionist theories (e.g., by 
attributing powers to objects). 
The third bad reason to reject the anti-reductionist modal intuition purports to 
rest on a demonstration that there is no coherent philosophical account of laws 
compatible with that intuition. Here I have in mind Lewis, who quite rightly argues 
that Armstrong’s account of laws as higher-order relations between universals is 
inadequate, but then concludes, on the basis of an equally inadequate survey of the 
alternatives, that reductionism is the only viable position that remains. Here is an 
example of where the crucial bit of overlooking happens:  
 
To begin, we may be certain a priori that any contingent truth whatever is made true, 
somehow, by the pattern of instantiation of fundamental properties and relations by 
particular things. In Bigelow’s phrase, truth is supervenient on being.... If two possible 
worlds are discernible in any way at all, it must be because they differ in what things are in 
them, or in how those things are. And “how things are” is fully given by the fundamental, 
perfectly natural, properties and relations that those things instantiate. (1994, pp. 473-4) 
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Lewis takes it that Armstrong’s account of laws respects the allegedly a priori 
constraint he lays down here11, because Armstrong’s posited higher-order universal 
of “necessitation” counts as a perfectly natural relation. It’s just that this account is 
deeply objectionable on other grounds (notably, Armstrong never makes it 
adequately clear why the “necessitation” universal deserves that name).  
But now consider an anti-reductionist view like Maudlin’s (2003), which holds 
that laws are metaphysically primitive features of the world, that determine how 
complete physical states generate successive physical states. Are we to suppose that 
this primitivism somehow violates the a priori principle that truth supervenes on 
being? Lewis seemed to think so.12 That verdict does not withstand scrutiny. Notice, 
in the passage just quoted, how Lewis slides from the perfectly benign 
characterization of the key constraint in the penultimate sentence, to the tendentious 
and indeed question begging formulation in the last sentence. The benign 
characterization is reminiscent of and perhaps equivalent to the thesis I endorsed in 
§2, that there is such a thing as the fundamental ontological structure of the world. 
But it may well be that, for Maudlin, characterizing the complete fundamental 
ontological structure of the world requires us to break out of preconceived 
metaphysical categories—in particular, facts about laws do not consist in facts about 
the instantiation by particulars of properties and relations. That just shows that the 
claim that “truth supervenes on being” loses its status as uncontroversially a priori 
once glossed in the way Lewis prefers. If, on the other hand, this claim simply 
amounts to the thesis that there is some fundamental ontological structure to the 
world, and all facts about the world supervene on facts about this structure, then by 
all means we should uphold it as a nonnegotiable a priori truth. But, pace Lewis, we 
should not expect this claim to be of any use in settling the debate between 
reductionists and anti-reductionists. 
What, then, is the best reductionist response to the thought experiments? Simply 
to claim that constructing a theory that respects them comes at too great a cost in 
clarity and coherence. Yes, the reductionist position comes at a clear intuitive cost. 
Yes, other things equal, it would be better not to have to pay that cost. But other 
things are not equal. Why not? That is a vexed question. It is not, as Maudlin rightly 
emphasizes (2006), that the reductionist position can be properly motivated by 
appeal to some empiricist condition on concept formation, since we no longer think 
                                                
11 I can’t resist drawing attention to Lewis’s deft and ingenious use of rhetoric here: he doesn’t state 
that we are certain a priori of his key claim (such a bold pronouncement would have set off alarm bells 
in the attentive reader), but rather that we may be certain a priori of this claim. That makes things go 
down more smoothly. But then he turns right around and treats this claim as nonnegotiable! 
12 This impression was confirmed in conversation with him. 
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we have in hand a plausible candidate for such a condition. Nor can it be properly 
motivated simply by complaining that facts about the anti-reductionist’s laws are 
underdetermined by the empirical data, since general anti-realism about the 
unobservable is—the mischief wrought by van Fraassen and others 
notwithstanding—a ridiculous epistemological position. 
But we have to be careful here, for these observations hardly show that the 
world is safe for anti-reductionism. Agreed: there are certain bad empiricist theories 
of concept formation (the impressions-based theory of Hume; various verificationist 
theories) according to which the anti-realist position is conceptually incoherent. 
Agreed: there is a certain bad epistemological theory (generalized skepticism about 
the unobservable) according to which the anti-realist position yields the unacceptable 
conclusion that we can’t possibly know what the laws are. But the existence of bad 
philosophical theories proves nothing. In particular, that these theories are so bad 
does very little (pace Maudlin) to show that there are no epistemic or conceptual 
grounds for doubt about anti-reductionism. And it is clearly such doubts, however 
loosely formulated, that form the primary motivation for Humean reductionism. 
Here is a nicely representative expression of these doubts, from Loewer: 
 
Carroll and Maudlin drop the metaphors of directing and guiding and simply maintain 
that laws fail to supervene on the Humean facts. So far as I can see, there is no incoherence 
in their position. There are possible worlds in which some regularities instantiate a non-
Humean property X and in which these regularities satisfy all the conditions on laws with the 
exception of [the requirement that laws govern regularities]. However, there are still 
metaphysical puzzles about A-laws [“A” for Armstrong, a leading anti-reductionist]. It is the 
fact that a generalization instantiates property X that is supposed to empower it to explain its 
instances, support counterfactuals, etc.; i.e., it is that fact which makes it a law. The 
metaphors of directing and guiding or Armstrong’s invocation of necessitation are supposed 
to provide some sort of an account of how A-laws explain their instances, support 
counterfactuals, etc. But once these metaphors are rejected [as, Loewer argues elsewhere, 
they should be] it is unclear why or how the satisfaction of X enables a generalization to 
perform these feats. Carroll and Maudlin simply accept that it is a basic fact that A-laws 
explain, etc., without providing any account of what it is about them that enables them to do 
so. Their attitude is hardly different from Armstrong’s recommendation of natural piety. Our 
reasons for believing that there are A-laws have to be very strong to justify such devotion. 
(Loewer 1996, p. 119) 
 
So here, I think, is where we stand. The reductionist should recognize that much 
of our ordinary conception of law of nature, and indeed, much of our scientifically 
informed conception, has a distinctly anti-reductionist cast to it. So he should be 
forthright that he is advocating an at least modestly revisionist account of laws of 
nature. He needs to make clear the benefits of going revisionist, and make clear that 
the costs are not exorbitant. But by the same token, there is unfinished business on 
Humean Reductionism About Laws of Nature 26 
  
his opponent’s part in laying out a transparently coherent anti-reductionist theory, 
one that shows—without relying on unhelpful metaphors of “directing”, “guiding”, 
or “governing”—how laws, as she conceives them, can do the various jobs required 
of them.  
The honest verdict, then, is that as far as this part of the debate is concerned, we 
have an unsatisfactory stalemate. Let’s move on. 
§5.2. Essentialism about physical magnitudes 
A second, and quite different anti-reductionist intuition defends the essentialist 
position mentioned earlier by targeting the reductionist commitment to a limited 
principle of recombination. A reductionist will, for example, recognize as possible a 
world containing just two particles, oppositely charged and both possessing mass, 
but moving in such a way that they are accelerating away from each other. Granted 
that this world is not nomologically possible; it is still metaphysically possible. Or so 
the reductionist will and must claim, given that he holds that mass, charge, and 
position are perfectly natural magnitudes such that the way any one of them is 
instantiated places no metaphysical constraints on the ways the others are 
instantiated. The anti-reductionist we are now considering denies that there is such a 
possible world—or, more carefully, denies that it has been correctly described as one 
in which mass and charge are instantiated. (She can perfectly grant that there are 
possible worlds in which two particles instantiating other, “alien” physical 
magnitudes accelerate away from each other in the given matter.) She might hold, 
with Shoemaker (1980), that nothing could count as mass or charge unless it were 
governed by exactly the same fundamental laws as actually govern it; or she might 
hold a more moderate position (which may be Cartwright’s: see her 1999), according 
to which something counts as having mass only if it has broadly the same causal 
powers that actual massive objects do (where “broadly” is intended to be more 
permissive than “exactly”). Either way, the reductionist who thinks of mass and 
charge as among the fundamental perfectly natural magnitudes cannot agree with 
her. 
The essentialist position is sufficiently controversial, and the main arguments for 
it sufficiently weak, that I think it is quite acceptable for the reductionist to make no 
attempt at accommodating the essentialist’s intuition. But if he really wants to, there 
is a strategy he can pursue that will go some way towards mollifying this particular 
opponent. Since the strategy is independently interesting—and since there is also, as 
we will see, a much better motivation for it—we’ll take a look. 
The second, unofficial guiding idea behind Humean reductionism about laws 
provides the key. To see how, consider again the reductionist treatment of objective 
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chances. According to the reductionist, facts about the objective chances are not 
among the fundamental nonmodal facts of any world. All the same, there certainly 
are facts about objective chances. They are, very roughly, whatever a suitably 
informed LOPP would say they are. Take the case of our chancy Newtonian world. 
Here, our LOPP will have as evidence all the facts about how particles move, and 
what their masses and charges are. She will then consider hypotheses that make 
explicit use of the notion of chance. One of these hypotheses will, by her lights, be 
best. What makes it the case that the chances are what they are is simply that this 
hypothesis about them is best. We thus get, according to the reductionist, somewhat 
roundabout truth conditions for claims about objective chance: for example, the 
claim that at time t, the chance that particles A and B will collide elastically is x is true 
just in case the suitably informed LOPP would say it is true (never mind that, being 
an anti-reductionist, she means something different by this claim). 
A reductionist could perform exactly the same maneuver with respect to facts 
about mass and charge. That is, he could say that mass and charge are not 
fundamental, perfectly natural magnitudes, but rather are introduced in a manner 
exactly analogous to the way chance-facts are introduced. Consider our Newtonian 
particle world. The reductionist we are now considering holds that the only 
fundamental nonmodal facts there are about this world are facts about the locations of 
particles at all times.13 But a candidate system is now allowed to hypothesize, as it 
were, that particles are also characterized by additional magnitudes, and introduce 
equations connecting the values of these magnitudes to particle positions. These 
systems will thus start out as partially uninterpreted in a way exactly analogous to the 
way in which probabilistic candidate systems start out as partially uninterpreted 
(remaining so unless and until they are declared “best”). What would make it the case 
that there are masses and charges is just that there is a candidate system that says so, 
and that, partly by saying so, manages to achieve an optimal combination of 
simplicity and informativeness (informativeness, remember, only with respect to 
particle positions). So in our particle world, all they really are are facts about 
positions of particles at all times; but if we pretend that in addition, each particle is 
characterized by an unchanging value of two magnitudes (one with real values, the 
other with nonnegative real values), then we can write down very simple equations 
that encapsulate quite a lot of information about the particle motions. The final step 
is to let the facts about particle motions that make it the case that these equations 
achieve such an optimal balance of simplicity and informativeness constitute the 
                                                
13 Actually, he need not be quite so dogmatic: he could remain agnostic about the existence of other 
perfectly natural magnitudes, insisting only that their distribution makes absolutely no difference to 
what the fundamental physical laws are. 
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truth-makers for claims about particle mass and charge, so that those claims can now 
be understood as literally correct. What results, again, is a philosophical position 
about mass and charge that is exactly analogous to the position the BSA already takes 
about objective chance. Mass, charge, and chance are all, in a certain specific sense, 
manufactured magnitudes.14 
As such, they violate certain of our intuitive preconceptions. For example, just as 
we tend to think of the facts about the objective chance of decay of an unstable atom 
as being facts wholly intrinsic to the atom, so too we tend to think that the facts 
about the mass and charge of a particle are facts wholly intrinsic to that particle. In 
both cases, this intuition of intrinsicness has to go, if the reductionist is right. Still, 
this maneuver results in a position that unquestionably respects the letter (if perhaps 
not the spirit) of the essentialist’s intuition. For consider a world containing just two 
particles, accelerating away from each other. Could it be that these particles both 
have a value for mass, and have opposite charges? No. For on the present account, 
what it is for a particle to have a value for mass or charge is, inter alia, for it to belong 
to a world whose best system is the very same as the best system for our Newtonian 
particle world. And that system is not even true of the two-particle world we are 
considering. More generally, while we can still expect a principal of recombination to 
govern configurational magnitudes such as position—so that the position of one 
particle at one time places no metaphysical constraints whatsoever on the position of 
any other particle at any other time—only a highly constrained version of such a 
principle governs mass and charge. Specifically, if we limit our attention to the 
nomologically possible worlds, then we can say that for any given time, it is possible 
                                                
14 Barry Loewer has suggested, both in conversation and in an unpublished paper, that there might be 
a way to develop a best-system account that wholly dispenses with what he sees as an unfortunate 
commitment on Lewis’s part to a doctrine of natural properties and relations. The hope is that 
candidate systems can somehow specify both the laws and the natural properties as a “package deal”, so 
that which candidate system is best fixes which properties are natural. The idea in this section for a 
modified reductionist position first took shape as an attempt on my part to provide a partial 
fulfillment of Loewer’s aims: for candidate systems can now be seen as specifying what at least some of 
the basic physical magnitudes are. But Loewer’s more ambitious goal seems to me unreachable, and 
that is because I do not see how to accomplish even the more limited goal without firmly adhering to 
a distinction between basic physical magnitudes that are perfectly natural (even if these turn out to be 
only configurational magnitudes) and merely “manufactured” basic physical magnitudes. Put in terms 
of our LOPP, the worry is this: She needs to be given some information about the world—information 
that is specifiable independently of what the best system is—in order to have a basis on which to judge the 
various law-hypotheses. Granted: she need not be given any information about chances, nor even 
about masses and charges. (So facts about these quantities can be seen to obtain in virtue of which 
system is best.) But if, in addition, we deprive her of information about positions, what does she have 
left to go on? 
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for the particles existing at that time to have any distribution of masses and charges.15 
But that’s it. 
I mentioned above that there was another motivation for the “manufactured 
quantities” approach to mass and charge than the generous but probably misguided 
desire to appease the essentialist. It derives from the thesis that the primary aim of 
physics—its first order of business, as it were—is to account for motions, or more 
generally for change of spatial configurations of things over time. Put another way, 
there is one Fundamental Why-Question for physics: Why are things located where 
they are, when they are? In trying to answer this question, physics can of course 
introduce new physical magnitudes—and when it does, new why-questions will 
inevitably come with them. (So it is no part of the thesis we are considering that 
physics is only concerned with explaining motions; it is just that the other explanatory 
demands on it are, in a certain sense, derivative on this one.) Now, what exactly is 
physics doing, when it introduces these new magnitudes?  
One answer is that it is simply postulating new magnitudes, end of story. Perhaps 
these are fundamental, perfectly natural magnitudes; perhaps they are magnitudes 
that further investigation will show reduce to more fundamental ones. Regardless, it 
is part of this realist view that the success of a physical theory that postulates some 
magnitude at explaining motions—even perfect success, down to the most 
microscopic level—provides no guarantee that the theory is true in what it says 
about the given magnitude. For example, a Newtonian theory might perfectly 
capture the motions of particles in our world, but for all that be false: for it might be 
                                                
15 Matters are in fact a bit more complicated, for two reasons. First, in some of these nomologically 
possible worlds, the best system will not be the best system of our Newtonian world; so nothing in 
these worlds will count as having mass or charge. Accordingly, it would be more accurate to state the 
recombination thesis this way: First, define an “initial condition” as a specification of a finite number 
of particles, together with a distribution of masses, charges, positions, and velocities among them. 
Then for every mathematically possible initial condition, there is a nomologically possible world 
whose particle motions are given exactly by the equations of the best system for our world, as applied 
to this initial condition. In other words, the various possible ways of assigning values to the 
uninterpreted magnitudes of mass and charge, together with values to the (interpreted, obviously) 
values of position and velocity, produce, given the equations of our best system, a class of possible 
motions; these are exactly the nomologically possible motions. It does not matter that some of these 
motions will be exhibited in worlds in which there is no such thing as mass and charge. The second 
reason matters are more complicated than suggested in the text is that the text implicitly supposed 
that the best system for our world supplies an ICH that is maximally permissive. It is far from 
obvious that it should. How do we know that much greater informativeness cannot be achieved, at 
minor cost in complexity, by narrowing down the range of possible initial conditions in some manner? 
We don’t, as it turns out. But since this is precisely the issue over which §6 obsesses, we can afford to 
ignore it for now. 
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that the particles of our world merely behave as if they have masses and charges, 
when in fact they uniformly lack these magnitudes. 
A second, very different answer goes instrumentalist: “mass” and “charge” are 
merely introduced as calculational devices, in a way that utterly deprives claims about 
their distribution of truth-values. Rival claims about the mass or charge of some 
particle might lead to better or worse predictions about the motions of it and other 
particles; but while these predictions can certainly be evaluated for truth, the rival 
claims that partly underlie them cannot. 
The version of reductionism sketched in this section can be seen as trying to 
chart a course between these two answers. With realism, it holds that claims about 
masses and charges have truth-values. But in an instrumentalist spirit, it holds that 
the truth conditions for these claims concern, in effect, the predictive success of 
theories that employ them. In this way, it seeks to avoid the highly implausible 
view—a view that instrumentalism seems inevitably committed to—that a significant 
fragment of scientific language does not have the function of describing what the 
world is like, while at the same time denying the possibility of a certain kind of 
underdetermination—a kind that can easily seem absurd, given the central 
explanatory aims of physics. (We will come back to this underdetermination worry in 
§5.7, below.) 
Verdict: There is no serious threat from the essentialist position, but a natural 
way for the reductionist to accommodate it turns out to have independent interest. 
§5.3. Counterfactuals, explanation, induction 
The next set of challenges to reductionism can, I think, be dispensed with rather 
quickly. To set the stage, let us put our anti-reductionist glasses on, and consider how 
they will color our views of counterfactuals, explanation, and induction. The crucial 
idea is this: From the standpoint of an anti-reductionist, there is all the difference in 
the world between a possible world in which there are genuine laws governing the 
phenomena and a possible world that lacks such laws. For an anti-reductionist, the 
latter sort of world quite literally exhibits no constraints on how things in it can 
behave. For example, suppose there is some other particle world, with particle 
histories that exactly match those of our world. But, whereas our world is governed, 
we will stipulate, by Newtonian laws, this other world is governed by no laws 
whatsoever. For the anti-reductionist, that means that all of the following claims are 
true of this “Hume world”: 
• Counterfactuals that have perfectly determinate truth values in our world lack 
them in the Hume world—e.g., counterfactuals that say what would have happened 
if such-and-such a particle had been moving in such-and-such a way. 
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• Any regularities in the Hume world, however seemingly systematic, are literally 
inexplicable. Asked why they occur, the best one can say is that it is sheer 
coincidence. 
• Rational agents in the Hume world (assuming it is possible for there to be any) 
ought, if apprised of their sorry situation—that is, informed that they reside in a 
world governed by no laws—to make no plans for the future. For they ought to view 
the evidence of past regularities as providing no rational basis for expecting these 
regularities to persist. 
That such claims are true of the Hume world is a perfectly plausible consequence 
of the anti-reductionist position. But it would be question begging for the anti-
reductionist to judge that, since a reductionist claims that the world we live in is the 
kind of world that she would describe as a Hume world, it follows that the 
reductionist must himself be committed to the view that counterfactuals typically lack 
truth values, that regularities cannot be explained, and that induction is irrational. 
What we have here, in short, is a difference in outlook on one metaphysical issue—
what are laws?—that is so fundamental that it automatically infects the respective 
parties’ outlook on a range of other metaphysical and epistemological issues. 
A useful comparison might be the following: A dualist thinks that there is a 
fundamental metaphysical difference between the conscious and the non-conscious. 
Presumably, this difference has all sorts of ethical implications. For example, by the 
dualist’s lights, it might be perfectly ethically permissible to treat a genuine zombie in 
ways that it would be unimaginably horrific to treat a genuinely conscious human 
being—and this, quite regardless of whether the zombie displays the same overt 
physical behavior that a genuinely conscious human being does (appears  to be 
writhing in agony, and so on). Suppose that is right, and imagine a dualist who argues 
against her physicalist opponent as follows: “According to you, we are all just 
zombies. But if so, then it doesn’t matter how we treat each other. So your view has 
unacceptable ethical consequences, and therefore stands refuted.” That argument is 
Just. Plain. Silly.  
Verdict: The off-cited complaints about reductionism that it cannot give a proper 
account of counterfactuals, explanation, and induction are, likewise, silly. 
§5.4. Nomological possibility 
The next complaint—that the reductionist position yields a mistaken account of 
nomological possibility—is silly for a slightly different reason. The idea is this: an 
anti-reductionist will presumably hold that facts about what the laws are are 
themselves nomologically necessary, so that any world w and any world w’ that is 
nomologically possible relative to w must share the same laws. That does not follow 
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from a reductionist position. Indeed, the BSA straightforwardly contradicts this 
claim. For example, our Newtonian particle world will count as nomologically 
possible a world with a single particle moving with constant velocity. But the best 
system for such a pared down world will likely include the claim that all particles 
move with constant velocity—and so will not count our own world, rich as it is in 
complicated particle motions, as nomologically possible relative to it. 
Now, it is important to note here something that is very often overlooked in the 
literature, which is that the intuition that is being violated is quite distinct from the 
central anti-reductionist intuition discussed in §5.1. One way to see this is to notice 
that it is quite easy to construct a reductionist position that respects the given 
intuition. For example, we could begin with the BSA, and then define a 
nomologically possible world as a world in which the best system for our world is 
not only true, but is also the best system: that immediately secures the desired result that 
nomological possibility consists in the perfect sharing of laws.  
Still, all we really accomplish by this maneuver is moving the bump in the 
intuition-carpet around a bit. For we will have preserved the intuition about 
nomological possibility at the price of saying strange things about which specific 
worlds are nomologically possible. In our Newtonian example, we get the conclusion 
that any nomologically possible world is a world with Newton’s laws, but at the cost 
of saying that it is nomologically impossible that there be just a single particle.  
How bad an intuitive cost do we have here? Not that bad, as far as I can see. The 
best way to pay it, I think, is for the reductionist to opt for the less revisionist 
account of which worlds are nomologically possible (so that the single-particle world 
counts as nomologically possible), admit that some of the nomologically possible 
worlds will have different laws—and then go on to challenge his anti-reductionist 
opponent to demonstrate how this slightly unusual position about nomological 
possibility will make a difference to the way in which the notion of law is used in 
actual scientific practice.  
I doubt she will be able to succeed. For example, she might exhibit certain 
counterfactuals about which the reductionist is forced to say odd things, e.g. this 
one: “If the world had contained just one particle, then it would have been such that, 
if it had contained a second particle, then both particles would have moved with 
constant velocity.” According to the reductionist, a nomologically possible world 
with just one particle is, plausibly, one in which it is a law that all particles move with 
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constant velocity; so it is a world in which the embedded counterfactual is true. That 
appears to make the counterfactual as a whole true, which is, admittedly, odd.16 
On the other hand, such nested counterfactuals do not appear to have any 
significant role to play in the central scientific practices of prediction and 
explanation. What’s more, the reductionist could propose a special semantical rule 
governing the evaluation of such counterfactuals, according to which one must, if 
possible, stay within the sphere of nomological possibility—actual nomological 
possibility—when assigning them truth values. So the given counterfactual would be 
evaluated as follows: First, we find the closest nomologically possible world that 
contains just one particle. Then, we find the closest world to it that (1) is 
nomologically possible relative to the actual world; and (2) contains two particles. 
Since this is a world in which the embedded consequent is false, the counterfactual as 
a whole is false.  
Verdict: The anti-reductionist intuition about nomological possibility poses no 
serious threat to reductionism. 
§5.5. Objective chance and subjective probability 
A closely related problem concerns the reductionist treatment of objective 
chance, and an alleged conflict with a certain plausible principle relating chance to 
credence. To set the stage, recall the reductionist account of the chance-facts that 
obtain in the simple version of a chancy Newtonian world: Particles sometimes 
collide; when they do, they sometimes rebound elastically, and sometimes stick 
together; the frequency data show no (simple) dependency of outcome type on the 
parameters that characterize collisions; so the best system, plausibly, will describe 
each collision as having a fixed single-case chance for each outcome, where these 
chances are independent of one another. The values for these chances, finally, will 
simply equal the corresponding frequencies of each outcome type. In particular, let f be 
the frequency of elastic collisions; then for any time immediately before a collision, 
the chance, at that time, that that collision will be elastic is f. 
Focus on time zero for this world. The laws, we are supposing, are an amalgam 
of the Newtonian laws and the probabilistic collision law. Together, they will fix a 
probability distribution for various possible future histories: the histories that have, 
at time zero, some chance of coming about. (And this probability distribution is 
really all we need: chances at later times derive from it by conditionalizing on 
intervening history. See my 2004.) Among these histories will be ones in which the 
                                                
16 And it is no help to shift to the version of reductionism that makes nomological possibility 
symmetric; that just turns the given counterfactual into a counterlegal, which is even more odd. 
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frequency of elastic collisions differs from f. But if one of these histories comes about, 
then the best system for the world that results will not be the actual best system; 
instead, it will be a system that includes a probabilistic collision law that contradicts the 
actual collision law, by specifying different single-case chances. In short, there are 
worlds w that have laws different from the actual laws, and more specifically have at 
time zero chance distributions over possible futures different from the actual chance 
distribution—but that count as not merely nomologically possible (i.e., in conformity 
with the actual laws, in their nonmodal respects), but possible in the stronger sense 
that the actual laws assign them some non-zero chance of coming about. For short, 
the Humean’s probabilistic laws say that there is some chance that they won’t turn out 
to be the laws. 
As before, the reductionist can avoid this outcome by a crude but effective 
maneuver: stipulate that a world counts as nomologically possible iff it has the same 
best system as the actual world, and then modify the chances by conditionalizing the 
time-zero distribution on the proposition true in all and only nomologically possible 
worlds. For example, in our chancy Newtonian world, the resulting distribution will 
say that only those future histories in which the frequency of elastic collisions is f 
have any chance of coming about. But as before, the crude maneuver creates new 
problems: in this case, it yields objective chances that behave in exceedingly funny 
ways. (E.g., the collision chances won’t remain constant, from trial to trial. See 
Arntzenius & Hall 2003 for more details.) Better, I think, just to live with the 
peculiar consequence that the laws assign a non-zero chance to some “undermining” 
futures. 
Now, just how peculiar a consequence is that? First, some perspective: remember 
that a reductionist is already committed to denying a very firmly entrenched intuition 
about chances, that we all share: namely, that it is metaphysically possible for distinct 
chances to give rise to exactly the same phenomena. (Our LOPP thinks so; that is 
why, when fully informed about particle behavior in our chancy Newtonian world, 
she nevertheless assigns a credence distribution over a continuous range of hypotheses 
about the collision chances.) He owes us some good reasons for abandoning this 
intuition; we’ll come back to what those might be in a moment. But for now it’s 
enough to point out that if he can provide them, they will surely compensate, in 
addition, for the somewhat less blatantly anti-intuitive result that there can be 
undermining futures. 
Unless, that is, this result leads to a contradiction. Lewis, and many others, once 
thought so. For it seemed a plausible principle relating subjective degrees of belief to 
objective chances that, roughly, if one knew what the objective chance was of some 
given outcome, and didn’t have any additional “inadmissible” information about that 
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outcome (for example, news from the future as to what that outcome would be), then 
one’s subjective degree of belief in that outcome should equal this chance value, on 
pain of irrationality (see Lewis 1980 for the classic discussion). But now transport 
yourself to time zero in our chancy Newtonian world, and imagine that you are 
apprised of the time-zero chances, and of nothing else. Then according to our 
principle, you should assign some non-zero credence to the prospect that future 
history exhibits a frequency of elastic collisions different from f. But wait—you’re a 
Humean. So you think—indeed, are certain—that the chance-facts of which you have 
been informed are made true by the total pattern of nonmodal facts that is about to 
unfold. More specifically, you are certain that if that pattern includes a frequency of 
elastic collisions different from f, then those chance-facts could not possibly be what 
you have been told they are. So you should assign no credence to the prospect that 
future history exhibits a frequency of elastic collisions different from f. 
Contradiction! We can conclude, it would seem, that the reductionist’s position is, 
even if true, quite literally unbelievable. (Lewis famously called this problem the “big 
bad bug”.) 
Not so fast. The argument errs, although in a way that is easy to miss.17 Since this 
part of the story has been well rehearsed in the recent literature (see my 2004), I will 
be brief. The credence-chance principle just alluded to contains a mistake: it fails to 
properly incorporate the way in which so-called “inadmissible” information ought to 
affect credence, when chances are known. Properly amended, the principle no longer 
says that the presence of inadmissible information breaks the connection between 
credence and chance; rather, it gives a precise formula for how that information 
changes the connection. The crucial additional observation is that for the reductionist, 
                                                
17 There is one error, all too often attributed to it in the literature, that it does not make, which is the 
“error” of failing to take note of the contingent nature of the thesis of Humean supervenience. (See 
for example Vranas 2002; this is an example of the “mischief” alluded to in §2.) It is true that Lewis 
himself held his thesis to be contingent. He did so in part for good but irrelevant reasons: the official 
thesis says, among other things, that the only perfectly natural relations there are are spatiotemporal 
relations, and Lewis granted the possibility of others. And in part for bad but irrelevant reasons: he 
thought that Armstrong’s “spinning sphere” thought experiment shows that there are worlds in which 
some things persist through time by being wholly present at each moment of their existence (and so 
not by being composed of momentary time-slices), and he thought that two such worlds could differ 
with respect to what is true at them (in one, the sphere is spinning; in the other it is stationary) 
without differing with respect to their Humean facts. Never mind why this is a bad reason; neither it 
nor the good reason provide the slightest grounds for thinking that Lewis thought of the Humean’s 
account of chance as contingently true. And even if he did think this, he shouldn’t have: it is a ridiculous 
mistake for a reductionist to concede that an anti-reductionist account of chance is metaphysically 
possible (essentially for reasons we’ve already rehearsed: how could he then claim to know that it 
wasn’t actual?). And anyway, conceding this possibility wouldn’t really help in avoiding the 
contradiction presented in the text (I’ll leave it as an exercise to show why).  
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information about chances is itself “inadmissible”, since it is in part information 
about the future history of outcomes. (So the original problem wasn’t really that the 
reductionist account of chance contradicts a plausible credence-chance principle, but 
rather that it renders that principle useless.) That is no problem, since the revised 
credence-chance principle can smoothly handle this inadmissible information: it says, 
roughly, that if one knows the chances, then one’s credence should equal those 
chances, conditional on one’s total evidence. In knowing the chances, one’s total 
evidence includes (according to the reductionist) information about the future: in our 
example, it includes the information that the frequency of elastic outcomes will be f. 
The unconditional chance of some different frequency is non-zero; but the chance, 
conditional on this information, is of course zero. So too, our agent’s credence. There 
is no contradiction, after all. The icing on the cake, finally, is that the revised 
credence-chance principle can be motivated—motivated extremely well, in my 
view—on grounds entirely independent of the metaphysical debate over whether 
chance-facts reduce to nonmodal facts. So there is not even room for the complaint 
that the reductionist avoids the “bug” only at the cost of adopting an unattractive 
credence-chance principle. 
Questions involving the epistemology of chance prove to be a red herring. But 
we would still like to know what advantages of the reductionist position might 
compensate for its unintuitive metaphysical consequences. Here, one finds the usual 
complaints that the anti-reductionist alternative is too obscure, supplemented by a 
new complaint that it is in fact the anti-reductionist who runs into trouble with 
credence-chance principles. Thus Lewis:  
 
Be my guest—posit all the primitive unHumean whatnots you like. (I only ask that your 
alleged truths should supervene on being.) But play fair in naming your whatnots. Don’t call 
any alleged feature of reality “chance” unless you’ve already shown that you have something, 
knowledge of which could constrain rational credence. I think I see, dimly but well enough, 
how knowledge of frequencies and symmetries and best systems could constrain rational 
credence. I don’t begin to see, for instance, how knowledge that two universals stand in a 
certain special relation N* could constrain rational credence about the future coinstantiation 
of those universals. (Lewis 1994, p. 484) 
 
That there is almost nothing here by way of argument has not, regrettably, 
prevented Lewis’s opinion from gaining widespread acceptance (for a typical 
example, see Schaffer 2003). That reaction is long overdue for a correction. Having 
discussed this issue before (in Hall 2004), I will again be brief. Lewis overlooks three 
key points. First, any sane epistemology must accept that there are some constraints 
on rational credence that cannot be explained in terms of other such constraints; it is 
open to the anti-reductionist to treat the appropriate credence-chance principle as 
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one of these. Second, there are versions of anti-reductionism about chance that can 
explain the normative force of the credence-chance principle in terms of other 
normative constraints on credence—for example, the “primitivist hypothetical 
frequentism” discussed in Hall 2004. Third, and most significantly, a close look at 
worked-out examples strongly suggests that reductionism lacks the resources to explain 
credence-chance principles in terms of other principles; “dimly” turns out to fall far 
short of “well enough”. So there is really no point in pretending any longer that 
reductionism holds some special advantage over its rivals when it comes to 
accounting for the relationship between credence and chance. 
It does, however, appear to hold an advantage in another arena, which is in the 
treatment of statistical mechanical probabilities. Suppose you put an ice cube in 
water; there is an astronomically small but nonzero probability that it won’t melt. 
Now, what sort of claim is that? One unhappy alternative: the interaction between 
ice cube and water is a genuinely indeterministic process, and the claim simply 
reports the objective chance. Another, slightly happier but still pretty unhappy 
alternative: it is a claim about the degree of belief it is reasonable to have that the ice 
cube won’t melt. And a much better, truly contented alternative: it is a probability 
that derives from a probability distribution over microstates compatible with the 
initial macrostate of the universe, conditionalized on facts about the present 
macrostate of the universe (including, in particular, the macro-facts about the ice 
cube and the water; see Albert 2000 for an explication of this treatment of statistical 
mechanical probabilities). What is needed next is an account of the status of this ur-
distribution. At this point, the anti-reductionist seems at a loss, for it seems essential 
to her position that objective probabilities can only characterize irreducibly stochastic 
processes, and by definition no such process can result in a setting for the initial 
microstate of the universe. By contrast, there is at least room for the reductionist to 
explore the possibility that a candidate system for a world—even a candidate system 
that posits deterministic dynamical laws—might significantly increase its 
informativeness by positing, in a compact form, a probability distribution over initial 
states. Remember, furthermore, that the truth conditions for a claim that there is 
such-and-such an ur-distribution will be given by the way in which the nonmodal 
facts single out the candidate system making this claim as best; so the reductionist is 
not at all committed to a way of conceiving of chances that makes it unintelligible 
how there could be probabilities over initial states. This point, I think, displays a 
genuine and significant advantage for the reductionist. Loewer, who has done more 
than any other philosopher to develop the ideas sketched here (see for example his 
2001), likes to say that the key advantage of the BSA is that it can make room for 
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laws about initial chances. But I don’t think that is quite right; rather, the key 
advantage is that it can make room for intelligible claims about initial chances. 
Verdict: The reductionist runs roughshod over certain entrenched intuitions 
about the metaphysics of objective chance; but he has something definite to show 
for it. 
§5.6. The problem of the ratbag idealist 
The next challenge to consider was already raised in one of the passages quoted 
above from Lewis; we will call it the “problem of ratbag idealism”. Here, I think, 
Lewis and other reductionists have in fact missed a chance to perform a nifty judo 
move on their opponents. Recall the challenge: standards for judging candidate 
systems—in particular, the standards of simplicity—are supposed to be “up to us” in 
a way that exposes a deep and offensive subjectivity in the BSA. It is at this point 
that the second guiding idea—which, remember, can be phrased as the claim that the 
standards for judging candidate systems should be the very standards that an anti-
reductionist endorses as appropriate epistemic standards for figuring out what the laws 
are—comes into its own. 
Here is the idea. Perhaps it was a mistake for the BSA, as set forth by Lewis and 
others, to implicitly assume that the simplicity of a theory is in fact one of the things 
we focus on as a guide to its truth. If so, the problem is not with the core idea 
behind the BSA but with its particular implementation. So suppose otherwise. 
Suppose, that is, that everyone should agree that one of the considerations our LOPP 
should use in deciding which of the various law-hypotheses is correct is its simplicity 
(when expressed in accordance with some appropriate scheme of representation). 
The anti-realist insistently reminds us that these standards are merely epistemic 
standards, standards such that we ought, as a normative epistemic sense matter, to 
believe that hypothesis that scores highest with respect to them. But then the 
problem of the ratbag idealist is very much her problem. In fact, it is even more her 
problem. For consider: If it is somehow “up to us”, in an objectionable sense, what 
counts as simple, then by the anti-reductionist’s lights, central facts of normative 
epistemology are also up to us: facts about what one ought to believe about the laws, 
in the face of empirical evidence. To parrot Lewis: “Now, some ratbag idealist might 
say that if we don’t like the misfortunes that our epistemological principles have 
visited upon us, we can change these principles—in fact, we can make them always 
have been different—just by changing the way we think!” 
That, I think, is a much deeper lunacy than the kind Lewis seeks to evade. In 
effect, the anti-realist who endorses the ratbag idealist challenge to the BSA is 
committing herself to following position: “I believe there are facts about the world 
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that logically go beyond the sorts of facts that even in principle could serve as our 
evidence. Still, we can have good reason to think that we have got these facts right, if 
we construct theories about them that, among other things, score well on our 
standards of simplicity. Of course, what counts as ‘simple’ is a matter having to do 
with highly idiosyncratic features of human psychology, features that we could 
change if we wanted to. All the same, I am committed to treating simplicity of a 
theory as an epistemically good guide to its truth.”  
That really does strike me as crazy. By contrast, the reductionist position seems 
perfectly sane, at least by its own metaphysical lights. And here, just to be clear, I am 
parting company with Lewis. I think he was deeply mistaken to think that there was 
any danger whatsoever posed by the problem of ratbag idealism. To see why, we 
need to step back for a moment, and reflect on the implications of the basic 
metaphysical outlook adopted by the reductionist. It helps to keep firmly in mind 
that he thinks that for any world, all there is to that world is a distribution throughout 
space and time of various perfectly natural magnitudes. For example, all there is to 
our Newtonian particle world are some particles moving around, with masses and 
charges. That’s it. It is emphatically not that the facts about these particles serve as 
clues to something “behind the scenes” that is directing their behavior. That is quite 
the wrong way to think about it. In fact, a much better way to think about the status 
of laws, given such a background metaphysics, is pragmatically.  
Here is an example, that will help clarify what I have in mind: Suppose you are a 
biologist, and you have long since learned to renounce vitalism. You face the 
question what, given your anti-vitalist commitments, should count as “life”. The first 
thing you should do is to scrap that question, and replace it with a slightly different 
one: What, given your anti-vitalist commitments, is the best—i.e., theoretically most 
useful—way to draw a distinction between things in the world that might roughly 
correspond to our ordinary living/nonliving distinction? You might find that there 
are a number of candidate ways to draw this distinction. You might find that the 
choice between them should be made entirely on grounds of theoretical utility—
indeed, that for some purposes one way of drawing the distinction is useful, for 
other purposes another. So too, I claim, with laws—at least, given a reductionist 
metaphysics. We have an array of nonmodal facts about a world—as it might be, 
facts about how many particles there are, what their masses and charges are, and how 
they are moving. Science, presumably, is in the business of investigating that stuff. It 
is not in the business of investigating any further stuff that lies behind the scenes, for 
the scenery constitutes all of reality. So do not ask what, given such a metaphysical 
outlook, laws are. Ask instead how, given such a metaphysical outlook, one might 
usefully draw a distinction between certain facts about the world that are in some 
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sense distinctively appropriate targets for scientific inquiry, and other facts that are less 
interesting and central. 
As far as I can see, for a thoroughgoing reductionist about “laws”, the only 
interesting sense in which that word picks out a subject matter worthy of 
philosophical attention is if it demarcates a class of claims about the world that are, 
somehow, distinctively appropriate targets for scientific inquiry. It is, of course, a 
good and hard question what would make some claim a distinctively appropriate 
target for scientific inquiry. We will look into this issue in a bit more depth below, in 
§6. For now, I simply wish to note that there is evidently plenty of room for the view 
that it is in part facts about us—idiosyncratically about us, and our peculiar human 
psychologies—that play a role in determining the most appropriate way for us to 
structure our investigation of the world. How could the details of our peculiar 
human situation not be relevant to this matter?  
Here, the contrast with the anti-reductionist could not be sharper. On her view, 
the laws governing a world demarcate a range of facts about the world profoundly, 
fundamentally distinct from any other kinds of facts, a range of facts with deep and 
interesting metaphysical connections to the realm of nonmodal facts. And given that 
they are empirically accessible at all, only the most remarkably incurious person 
could fail to think that scientific inquiry ought to be structured in part with the aim 
of uncovering them. By contrast, a reductionist cannot think of laws as having some 
such natural epistemic magnetism to them. To put the point pithily, for the anti-
reductionist, the nature of laws automatically makes them distinctively appropriate 
targets for scientific inquiry; whereas for the reductionist, it is exactly the reverse. On 
his view, all it could come to for a claim to achieve the status of law is that, for some 
other and independent reason, it is a distinctively appropriate target for scientific 
inquiry. Why should he worry in the slightest if those other reasons make crucial 
reference to highly idiosyncratic features of human psychology? It would be as if a 
biologist lost sleep over the thought that, if the distinctive interests of the 
community of biologists were different, they might draw the distinction between 
living and nonliving things differently. Yes, they would. And that would be perfectly 
appropriate. By the same token, if the community of scientists (or perhaps just 
physicists) sees fit to change its standards for what counts as simple, then according 
to the reductionist there ought to be a corresponding shift in what counts as a 
fundamental law—that is, what counts as a distinctively appropriate target for 
scientific inquiry. So what? 
Verdict: It would have been smarter for the anti-reductionist to keep quiet about 
the ratbag idealist. But taking stock of the problem this creature poses allows us to 
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significantly sharpen our understanding of the differences between reductionism and 
anti-reductionism. (§6 will take advantage of this improved understanding.) 
§5.7. A new skeptical problem? 
Our next problem comes from van Fraassen’s Laws and Symmetry. Or at any rate, 
it is inspired by van Fraassen; his own discussion is sufficiently obscure that I’m not 
sure I’ve captured his intent. No matter. The problem I will set forth is sufficiently 
interesting, whether it is the one van Fraassen had in mind or not. 
Imagine two worlds. The first is our own, well-behaved Newtonian particle 
world. The second perfectly matches our world in certain key respects: in particular, 
it has the same number of particles, and they follow exactly the same trajectories as 
the particles of our world. But the masses and charges are completely different—
swapped all around, we can suppose, in such a way that there is absolutely no hope 
of writing down simple equations involving mass and charge that will capture a lot of 
information about particle motions in this world. Such a world is clearly possible. In 
fact, countless such worlds are possible: just hold fixed the particle trajectories in our 
world, and change their other magnitudes. (One could even add brand new 
magnitudes.) 
Why is this a problem? Well, it seems to confront us with a skeptical dilemma. 
Here we are, as scientists in our world, trying to figure out what its laws are. We have 
no direct access to the perfectly natural magnitudes that characterize our world at the 
microscopic level. What we do have access to are motions of large things, which of 
course are determined in a fairly direct way by motions of small things. But the 
screwed-up particle world we are imagining reproduces these motions exactly. That 
is, it is completely, and in principle, observationally indistinguishable from our own 
world. So what possible reason could we have for thinking that we are in a well-
behaved Newtonian particle world, as opposed to a particle world with randomly 
assigned, and therefore horribly behaved, perfectly natural magnitudes? The Lewisian 
appeal to perfectly natural magnitudes thus seems to erect an insurmountable 
epistemic barrier between us and knowledge of, our even reasonable belief about, the 
fundamental laws. 
I see two responses available to the reductionist. The first draws on the quasi-
instrumentalist treatment of mass and charge sketched in §5.2. There, it was offered 
in part as a way of mollifying essentialist intuitions about the connection between 
magnitudes such as mass and charge and the fundamental laws governing them. But 
it will, obviously, work equally well to dissolve the skeptical worry we are considering 
here. 
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There is, however, a second way to deal with that worry, not by dissolving it, but 
by exposing it as one we should be happy to live with. It is well to remember that it 
is not always a bad thing if one’s metaphysical commitments engender skeptical 
possibilities. For example, I think that there is a fact of the matter about what our 
world is like in its unobservable aspects—and that what it is like is certainly not 
logically determined by what the observable aspects are like. That opens the door to 
the skeptical possibility that, in spite of paying close attention to our best 
observational evidence, we get facts about the unobservable badly wrong. Yes, there 
obviously is such a skeptical possibility. And it is equally obvious that its mere 
existence does not establish the bizarre epistemic doctrine of anti-realism about the 
unobservable. By the same token, the mere existence of worlds that perfectly 
reproduce the motions of our world, but whose other perfectly natural magnitudes 
are horribly ill-behaved, does not by itself establish anti-realism about laws as the 
BSA conceives them. 
There is a bit more to say, and saying it helps to show not merely that van 
Fraassen hasn’t yet made his case, but that further effort is unlikely to help. For 
consider how we ought to describe our messed-up particle world, from the 
perspective of the BSA. It is, after all, a world that has its own laws. Given the way 
that masses and charges are swapped around, those laws are certainly not the 
Newtonian laws. They are something else. There seem to be two possibilities. The 
first is that there is a unique and highly informative best system for this world. The 
second, and more likely possibility, is that there is no candidate system that is both 
clearly superior to its rivals and highly informative. If the first possibility is correct, 
then the right way to describe this world is as follows: It has powerful laws, very 
different from our own, that combine with initial conditions so remarkably chosen 
that the motions that result look just like Newtonian motions. How remarkably 
chosen? Well, if any aspect of those initial conditions had been even slightly 
different, then the motions would have been manifestly non-Newtonian. But look, 
that is a skeptical possibility that we should all recognize. Of course it is possible to 
have very different laws, that permit a range of initial conditions, among which there 
will be at least one that is highly misleading—in the sense that it would, under those 
laws, evolve in such a way that the resulting history yielded overwhelmingly powerful 
evidence that the laws were something else. Our own laws are like that. For example, 
there are initial conditions compatible with our laws that would result in locally anti-
thermodynamic behavior; e.g., initial conditions that would lead to a history in which 
every ice cube put in a glass of warm water grew. Of course, the measure of such 
initial conditions is astronomically small. But nevertheless, they exist. And if one of 
them had obtained, we would have been led badly astray about what the laws of our 
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world are. By the same token, the scientists in the screwed-up particle world are 
badly wrong about their laws—but only because of what is, given the laws that in fact 
govern their world, a fantastically unlucky choice of initial conditions. 
The second possibility receives a similar treatment. According to it, our screwed-
up particle world simply lacks substantive laws, because the best system does not 
score very well on the standard of informativeness. Most likely, these laws will be 
non-deterministic (and not probabilistic either). So, given an initial condition, all they 
will manage to do is to lay down broad constraints on how that initial condition can 
evolve forward in time. So the right thing to say about this world is that, from its 
initial conditions, it just so happens—purely by accident—to evolve in a way that 
looks Newtonian. And again, this is a possibility we ought to recognize, regardless of 
our commitment to the BSA. We think that our world comes equipped with very 
powerful laws, perhaps even deterministic ones. But it could be that its laws are 
extremely loose, permitting a vast range of non-Newtonian physical behaviors that, 
through sheer luck, never happen to manifest themselves. It would be a foolish 
overreaction to design our metaphysics so as to rule out this possibility. 
Notice that in each case, it is not just that we find a way of describing the 
skeptical possibility that makes it seem quite mundane. In addition, these 
redescriptions reveal the skeptical possibilities to be ones that we have very good 
epistemic grounds to dismiss, assigning them vanishingly small shares of credence. 
The reasonable conditional probability, on the assumption that our world contains 
only very loose laws, that we would see perfectly Newtonian behavior is negligibly 
different from zero. Likewise, the conditional probability, on the assumption that our 
laws are quite strict but radically non-Newtonian, that the initial conditions would be 
so precisely tuned as to reproduce Newtonian phenomena, is negligibly different 
from zero. If you doubt any of this, remember our example of the ice cubes: Yes, it 
is possible, even holding fixed what we think our laws are, that the next time you put 
an ice cube in warm water, it will grow. But the appropriate degree of credence to 
assign to this prospect is so small as to make it effectively ignorable. 
Verdict: van Fraassen thinks that a serious skeptical problem bites the 
reductionist who endorses a Lewisian metaphysics of perfectly natural magnitudes; 
but close inspection reveals that this problem is wholly toothless. 
§5.8. The information that counts 
We come now to a problem that, I think, requires a substantial amendment to 
the BSA. To set things up, let us suppose that the BSA, when applied to our 
Newtonian particle world, succeeds to this extent: the best system—the one, 
remember, that optimally combines simplicity and informativeness—includes the 
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Newtonian dynamical laws. And let us suppose it also includes a broad constraint on 
initial conditions, so that the combined result is that it counts a world as 
nomologically possible only if that world contains a finite number of particles, each 
possessing some value of mass and charge, and moving on trajectories that perfectly 
conform with the Newtonian dynamical principles. So far, so good. The problem is 
that there is every reason to think that this “only if” cannot be strengthened to an “if 
and only if”; that is, that the best system for our Newtonian world will exclude too 
many worlds that ought to count as nomologically possible. 
A quick way to see this is to notice that we get a vast increase in informativeness, 
at only a small cost in simplicity, if we include in a candidate system a statement that 
says exactly how many particles there are. Only small cost in simplicity? Well, the cost 
might be modest, if the number of particles is a large number that is not 
mathematically identifiable in a simple way. But suppose it is. Suppose it turns out 
that there are exactly 264 particles in our world. Then a statement to that effect buys a 
lot of informativeness at a negligible cost in simplicity. And it seems quite wrong to 
think that, for that reason, it ought to count as nomologically necessary that there are 
264 particles. In the first place, particle number should turn out to be a nomologically 
contingent feature of the world. In the second place, even if you have somehow 
convinced yourself that there can be good grounds for considering particle number 
to be a nomologically necessary feature of the world, surely those grounds cannot be 
that this number is easily mathematically describable. 
At any rate, there are more pressing versions of this problem. Suppose, for 
example, that there is some moment of time such that the complete physical state of 
the world at that time happens to have a very simple to describe form: there is some 
relatively simple, compact way to say exactly what that state is. Let this state be S. 
Then, if a candidate system includes the Newtonian dynamical principles, a buys an 
enormous increase in informativeness by adding a statement to the effect that at some 
time, the complete physical state of the world is S. For doing so will shrink the set of 
nomological possibilities down to one. (Here I am taking advantage of the fact that 
Newtonian dynamics are two-way deterministic.) But that is a disaster, for remember 
that it is a nonnegotiable desideratum on an account of laws that it yield a nontrivial 
distinction between what is nomologically possible and what is not. 
Finally, it is a disaster that is unavoidable, essentially because it is guaranteed that 
our world exhibits a simple to describe state. For considering that the state of the 
world at any time can be coded up, in a very simple way, by a single real number: just 
take all the coordinates, masses, and charges of all the particles, expressed in decimal 
notation, and interleave the digits. Suppose we include this number in a candidate 
system; then once again, we get an increase in informativeness that shrinks the set of 
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nomological possibilities down to one. Call this the problem of the phony fundamental 
constant.  
“But,” comes the response, “don’t we get this increase in informativeness at the 
price of a huge increase in complexity? For even though the way in which this real 
number codes up complete information about a physical state is simple, the number 
itself is very unlikely to be at all simple. That is, there will be no mathematically 
compact way to specify its value.” 
I do not think there is any refuge in this response. Remember that it is part of 
the practice of physics to include in its theories fundamental constants. But it is no part 
of the practice of physics to insist that those constants have mathematically tractable 
values. Pick any mathematical standard of complexity of number you like, and a 
physicist will say that for all she knows, the fundamental constants might be that 
complex. (And do not think that we can buy mathematical simplicity by a suitable 
choice of units; the quickest way to see that this won’t work is to remember that 
some of the constants appearing in our current physical theories are unitless.) Yet it 
is nomologically necessary that the constants have the values they do. 
More to the point, there is something silly in all of these defenses, for they miss 
what is really going wrong in these problem cases, which is that a candidate system is 
scoring points for the wrong kind of informativeness. Recall how, in section 1, we 
factored our Newtonian specification of nomological possibilities into two parts: 
there is an Initial Conditions Hypothesis, that specifies what initial conditions are 
nomologically possible; and there is a Dynamical Hypothesis, that specifies how each 
such initial condition would evolve. The problems we are considering have the 
common feature that a candidate system wins merely because it narrows down the 
range of possibilities allowed by the ICH. That, I claim, is an increase in 
informativeness that ought not to count in favor of a candidate system that exhibits 
it.  
Stronger: it ought to count against a candidate system that exhibits it. (This idea is 
not new: compare Earman’s discussion in his 1984.) Part of the reason involves an 
appeal to intuition: facts about initial conditions seem, intuitively, to be the sorts of 
things that a good physical theory will treat as contingent. But a better reason focuses 
on the central explanatory practices of physics, which make essential use of 
counterfactuals concerning worlds with different initial conditions, but governed by 
the same dynamics as our world. What, for example, explains the fact that the 
planetary orbits deviate from perfectly elliptical orbits? The presence of other 
planets, and corresponding perturbation by interplanetary gravitational forces: for if 
all other planets were absent, then a given planet would orbit the sun in a nearly perfect 
ellipse. More generally, I claim, the ability to provide sharp and determinate truth 
Humean Reductionism About Laws of Nature 46 
  
conditions for a wide range of counterfactuals is precisely what lends a good physical 
theory its explanatory power. So, by unduly restricting the ICH, a candidate system 
will hamstring its ability to evaluate counterfactuals in a way that fatally undermines 
its explanatory potential. So it was a serious mistake for the BSA to incorporate a 
standard of informativeness according to which a candidate system automatically 
improves its score by narrowing the range of worlds it counts as nomologically 
possible. This is not the kind of informativeness that counts; and what’s more, once 
this standard is invoked, there is no way to avoid the devastating conclusion that the 
best system for our Newtonian particle world will count that world but no others as 
nomologically possible. 
Verdict: The official formulation of the BSA needs a substantial revision, in the 
form of an account of informativeness that is more sensitive to the actual practice of 
physics. The next section provides just such an account, and produces an elegantly 
amended BSA. But victory for the reductionist will be short-lived, for he will be 
hard-pressed to explain why, by his metaphysical lights, the amended BSA should be 
preferable to the original version. 
§6 A solution and a problem 
§6.1. Solving the problem of too much information 
If the diagnosis in §5.8 is correct, then it is easy to see how to produce an 
improved version of the BSA. Here is a sketch:  
Let a candidate system have two parts: an ICH, and a DH. A system is better to 
the extent that each of these parts can be specified in a simple way. But in the case of 
the ICH, a system is better to the extent that this hypothesis is uninformative—i.e., 
to the extent that it admits more initial conditions as nomologically possible. Where 
we want a candidate system to be informative is, instead, solely in its dynamical 
hypothesis. And, with respect to the informativeness of the DH, we can say 
something much more informative about what we mean by “informative” than 
Lewis did. That is because there is a clear, non-arbitrary standard of informativeness 
for a dynamical hypothesis to aim for: determinism, in both temporal directions.  
Next, there are fairly clear and non-arbitrary ways of falling short of the ideal of 
determinism. For example, a DH might be deterministic only towards the future. Or, 
it might be deterministic for all but a very small measure of initial conditions. Or it 
might be indeterministic only in a “punctuated” sense, so that only when certain 
specific and localized kinds of interactions take place does the DH fail to describe 
their outcomes in a deterministic fashion. (Our chancy Newtonian world was like 
that.) And even where the DH falls short of determinism, it might succeed in laying 
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down precise probabilities. It is, I think, a very interesting question how to develop a 
precise catalog of the varieties of less-than-perfect informativeness that a DH might 
exhibit. I will not pursue that question further here. Still, it is quite striking how, by 
shifting attention from the candidate system as a whole to just one component of 
it—its dynamical hypothesis—we have already arrived at a vastly more interesting 
characterization of “informativeness” then the utterly bland characterization 
routinely trotted out in the literature defending the BSA, that says only that 
informativeness is somehow a matter of narrowing down possibilities. It’s not; and 
even if it were, it would remain an embarrassment that the literature has been unable 
to say anything more illuminating. 
Why is two-way determinism the gold standard of informativeness for a DH? It 
is not just that this kind of informativeness is pretty clearly what physicists (many of 
them, anyway) would say that they aim for in their theories. They have, in addition, 
an excellent reason for setting their sights on such theories, since meeting this 
standard directly serves the theoretical purposes emphasized in §5.8: a theory that 
does so can, as a result, answer with great precision questions both about what 
would have happened, and about what would have to have happened, had conditions 
in the world been different in some specified respect. That is one extremely 
important way for a theory to increase its exploratory power. The other way, of 
course, is for the theory to incorporate a maximally permissive ICH.  
These observations suggest an amendment to the official guiding idea behind the 
BSA: what candidate systems aim for is not an optimal combination of simplicity and 
informativeness, but rather an optimal combination of simplicity and explanatory 
power—where explanatory power in turn is a function of the uninformativeness of 
the system’s ICH together with the informativeness of its DH. As before, the 
nomologically possible worlds will be exactly those that conform to the candidate 
system that wins out in this competition. (Or: that conform to each of those 
candidate systems that are tied for first. More, in a moment, on why we might need 
this formulation.) And as before, the desiderata we are seeking to maximize will be in 
some tension with each other. But—having “resolved” candidate systems into two 
distinguishable parts—we can say a bit more than defenders of the BSA usually do 
about the nature of this tension. 
To begin, the most straightforward way to achieve a maximally uninformative 
ICH is to take advantage of the limited principle of recombination governing 
perfectly natural magnitudes, so that the nomologically possible initial conditions will 
exactly coincide with the metaphysically possible ones, or at least the metaphysically 
possible ones that exhibit only the perfectly natural magnitudes found in our world. 
In the case of our Newtonian particle world, that will get us an ICH that counts as 
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possible any initial condition in which there are a finite number of particles, each 
possessing some value for mass, charge, and position (and in which there is nothing 
else).18 But it will presumably get us many more possibilities. For example, it will 
include initial conditions in which there are an infinite number of particles—even 
uncountably infinite. And it may include initial conditions featuring entities other than 
particles, but having mass and charge. By doing so, it will make the job of 
constructing a DH that is both simple and informative much, much harder.  
Consider some ways this might happen. First, it might be that our ICH (even 
when it is restricted so that the conditions it admits exhibit no magnitudes other than 
mass and charge) allows for possibilities that some candidate DH—as it might be, 
the DH that incorporates the standard Newtonian dynamical equations—simply 
doesn’t apply to. For instance, one cannot, for straightforward mathematical reasons, 
even apply the equations in the Hamiltonian formulation of classical particle 
mechanics to an initial condition featuring an uncountable infinity of particles. Of 
course, a candidate DH could accommodate such an initial condition simply by 
adding an extra clause, and indeed could do so in quite a simple fashion: for example, 
it could stipulate that if the world starts out with uncountably many particles, then all 
of these particles immediately vanish. Both simplicity and determinism (at least, 
toward the future) are retained, and the ICH is allowed to include many more 
possibilities. But the problem is that there are far too many ways for a DH to be 
simple and informative, while still “covering” those possibilities featuring 
uncountably many particles. And that is because the particle behavior exhibited in 
the actual world gives, intuitively, no guidance as to how to treat such bizarre initial 
conditions. 
One fix is to stipulate that what is nomologically possible is only what all such 
DH’s agree is nomologically possible. That would have the odd result that there 
could, compatible with the laws of our Newtonian particle world, have been 
uncountably many particles; but that if there had been, pretty much anything could 
have happened (provided only that it was simple to describe). A better fix is probably 
                                                
18 There is a complication here concerning velocity, which I will mostly pass by. The issue is this: facts 
about the velocities of particles, at a time, are plausibly not facts wholly intrinsic to the state of the 
world at that time. So if we think of our ICH as specifying a range of possible momentary states, then 
the DH we construct on top of it has, in our Newtonian example, no hope of being deterministic, in 
the sense that it specifies exactly one future, for each initial condition.  (That’s because the standard 
Newtonian equations need information not just about initial positions, but also about initial 
velocities.) But it comes infinitesimally close: for it is still the case that, for any two nomologically 
possible worlds, any time t, and any time interval Δt > 0,  if the worlds agree on the positions, masses, 
and charges of all particles throughout [t, t + Δt), then they agree throughout their entire histories. 
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to say that the ICH should be restricted, if doing so makes it possible to produce, in 
a non-arbitrary fashion, a simple and informative DH. 
In our example, that requirement would plausibly lead us to rule out any initial 
condition containing infinitely many (even countably infinitely many) particles. But 
problems will likely remain. For example, should we allow an initial condition in 
which there are just two oppositely charged, massive particles, moving on a straight 
line toward each other? Alas, the usual equations blow up, in such a case.19 We could, 
perhaps, evade this problem by insisting that the initial conditions specify, along with 
their masses and charges, only the positions of particles, and not also their velocities. 
Then we could say that the simplest, most informative DH (which is the one whose 
dynamical equations are the standard Newtonian ones) specifies, for each initial 
condition, a range of possible forward evolutions: namely, forward evolutions 
compatible with each way of tractably assigning velocities to the particles. (This way 
of putting things makes it vivid that our Newtonian DH is not two-way 
deterministic, in the very strongest sense that it fully fixes the history of the world, 
given only a single instantaneous state at some time. But we knew that already; cf. 
footnote 18.) Whether this maneuver will work is beyond my technical competence 
to assess.20 At any rate, the interaction between the need for a simple and informative 
DH, coupled with a simple and uninformative ICH, clearly merits further study. 
§6.2. A dilemma for Humean reductionism 
Our new, improved BSA immediately and effectively deals with the challenges 
raised in §5.8, concerning particle number, the possibility of a simple state, and the 
phony fundamental constant. What’s more, it seems to do so in a perfectly well-
motivated way: for remember that the intention of the BSA is to incorporate, as the 
standards for judging candidate systems, standards implicit in the best practice of 
physics. And those standards place a premium on physical theories that say a lot 
about what would have happened, under alternative possible conditions.  
But now we come to a problem. If, once again, we pay very close attention to the 
background metaphysical commitments that underlie the BSA, we can see that it 
faces a curious but difficult dilemma.21 Building the ICH/DH distinction into the 
                                                
19 And remember that there are other, more devious examples, where the equations apply, but where 
the particles end up accelerating to infinity; see footnote 2. 
20 It will work, just in case there is, for every configuration of masses, charges, and positions for 
finitely many particles, some way of assigning particle velocities such that the standard Newtonian 
differential equations yield a solution, when applied to these boundary values. 
21 There is an additional cost—though it pales by comparison to the one about to be discussed: a 
reductionist who adopts the amended BSA will not, at least without some fancy footwork, be able to 
endorse the treatment of statistical mechanical probabilities discussed in §5.5. For it is part of that 
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BSA seems to be necessary, in order to prevent Humean reductionism from being 
too violently at odds with the actual practice of physics, and in particular with its aim 
of constructing theories that are maximally explanatory powerful. For example, if 
physicists treat particle number in a Newtonian world as a nomologically contingent 
feature of that world, then, at the very least, someone who disagrees with them on 
purely philosophical grounds is in a highly uncomfortable position. But, however 
successful the new version of the BSA is at dodging potential counterexamples—and 
in particular, in securing agreement with the physicists about which initial conditions 
should be treated as nomologically possible—it is, by the Humean’s lights, entirely 
unmotivated. 
To see why, we should return to the conception of “law” emphasized in §5.6: 
some claim about the world counts as a law only to the extent that it is, on grounds 
independent of its nomological status, a distinctively appropriate target for scientific 
inquiry. Now, for the reductionist there is one obvious way to pick out a special set 
of claims: they will be claims about the kind and distribution of those perfectly 
natural magnitudes that characterize our world. (The anti-reductionist, too, can view 
these claims as special.) Such claims have a distinguished metaphysical status, insofar 
as all other facts about the world reduce to them. But, just as obviously, that is not 
enough of a distinction: one wants some further way of picking out, among all the true 
claims about the distribution of perfectly natural magnitudes, an elite subset that are 
distinctively appropriate targets for scientific inquiry. (Without some such further 
distinction, the reductionist’s account of laws will effectively collapse into the naïve 
regularity theory.) 
An anti-reductionist can say that certain claims about the fundamental, 
nonmodal facts deserve special attention because they hold as a matter of law. And so it 
makes perfect sense to structure inquiry in science—and especially in physics—in 
such a way that it has a chance of uncovering these laws. But for a Humean 
reductionist, all there is, fundamentally, is an assortment of nonmodal facts—facts 
that are all perfectly on a par, metaphysically speaking. Scientific inquiry is, in the 
first instance, merely directed at finding out about them. It would seem, then, that any 
further structure to this inquiry can be imposed only by the need to find out about 
those facts efficiently. Helen Beebee has provided an especially eloquent articulation of 
this idea: 
 
                                                                                                                                
treatment that the best system for an entropically well-behaved world like ours will include a 
statement to the effect that the world starts out in a very low entropy macrostate. And that is an 
example of a restriction on ICH that the amended BSA cannot, on the face of it, accommodate. 
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So the idea is something like this. Suppose God wanted us to learn all the facts there are 
to be learned. (The Ramsey-Lewis view is not an epistemological thesis but I’m putting it this 
way for the sake of the story.) He decides to give us a book—God’s Big Book of Facts—so 
that we might come to learn its contents and thereby learn every particular matter of fact 
there is. As a first draft, God just lists all the particular matters of fact there are. But the first 
draft turns out to be an impossibly long and unwieldy manuscript, and very hard to make 
any sense of—it’s just a long list of everything that’s ever happened and will ever happen. 
We couldn’t even come close to learning a big list of independent facts like that. Luckily, 
however (or so we hope), God has a way of making the list rather more comprehensible to 
our feeble, finite minds: he can axiomatize the list. That is, he can write down some universal 
generalizations with the help of which we can derive some elements of the list from others. 
This will have the benefit of making God’s Big Book of Facts a good deal shorter and also a 
good deal easier to get our rather limited brains around. (Beebee 2000, p. 547) 
 
It makes perfect sense, given a reductionist metaphysics, that a distinctively 
appropriate target for scientific inquiry is to figure out exactly which “axioms” God 
has written down: for doing so directly serves what can be the only ultimate aim of 
inquiry, which is to figure out as much of the nonmodal truth about the world as 
possible (there being no other truth to be had). But that seems to point us, alas, 
directly to Lewis’s original formulation of the BSA, with its premium on the kind of 
informativeness that consists merely in the narrowing down of possibilities. He 
suggested, in one of the passages we quoted, that the standards of simplicity and 
informativeness are “virtues that we aspire to in our own theory building”. If I am 
right about the proper diagnosis of the problems raised in §5.8, this suggestion is 
mistaken. While simplicity may be such a virtue, it is precisely uninformativeness that 
we aspire to in the part of our theory that tells us what initial conditions are possible. 
It is incomprehensible why this should be a virtue if, in the first instance, all that 
scientific inquiry consists in is an investigation of what the nonmodal facts are about 
our world. 
So the Humean reductionist seems to face the following dilemma: On the one 
hand, he can avoid conflict with the practice of physics by structuring the BSA 
around the ICH/DH distinction in the way described above; but it is unintelligible 
why, by his lights, the resulting standards are the right ones to use in choosing a best 
system. On the other hand, he can choose standards that make perfect sense, given 
his metaphysical commitments; but doing so appears to lead straight to the original 
version of the BSA, a theory that from the standpoint of the actual practice of 
physics is insane. This choice between a guilty intellectual conscience and insane 
revisionism is not a happy one. 
Consider, by contrast, what metaphysical viewpoint would motivate the 
importance of the ICH/DH distinction, and in particular an adherence to standards 
of theory choice that looks for an uninformative ICH, coupled with an informative 
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DH. It is not far to seek: it is the view that information about the counterfactual 
structure of the world is sui generis, and not merely disguised information about its 
nonmodal structure. If that is what you think, then of course you will want to build 
into your theorizing about the world techniques for accurately mapping this sui 
generis counterfactual structure. And that is exactly what the distinction between 
initial conditions and dynamics accomplishes. Notice, finally, that it is precisely a 
commitment to a sui generis counterfactual structure that unites all the disparate 
varieties of anti-reductionism. So the central feature of physical theorizing that we 
have focused on cleanly divides the Humean reductionist from his philosophical 
opponents. His position is not only philosophically uncomfortable, but lonely. 
 
§7 Conclusion 
As I noted at the outset, I think that the problem I have raised—challenging 
though I hope it is—is really an occasion for the Humean reductionist to sharpen his 
position still further. I am not sure what the best way is to do this, but here are some 
preliminary ideas (prompted mainly by conversations with Barry Loewer, who is one 
of the most thoughtful reductionists currently writing on the topic). 
Focus just on the problem posed by the phony fundamental constant, the one 
that codes up complete information about the physical state of our particle world at 
some time. I suggested that the proper way to deal with this problem is to build the 
ICH/DH distinction into the BSA—but that this suggestion is really a Trojan horse, 
since the resulting account is one that the reductionist ought to reject, given his 
metaphysics.  
Loewer has suggested (in conversation) a very different response. He observes 
that one serious defect in a system that incorporates the phony fundamental constant 
is that it codes up information about the state of the world in a form that is almost 
completely useless to us ordinary humans. To dramatize, suppose an Oracle starts to 
tell you the value of this constant, a few digits at a time. After she has told you a 
billion digits, you still have something that is virtually useless to you—even if you 
have unlimited computational power at your disposal. For this information allows 
you to make almost no new predictions. So perhaps the right lesson for the Humean 
reductionist is to return to Lewis’s original formulation, but insist that what is wanted 
from a candidate system is not merely information that narrows down possibilities, 
but information that is, in some suitable sense—and taking into account relevant 
facts about the condition that we humans find ourselves in—practically useful. 
One way to spell this idea out focuses on Beebee’s remarks about our “rather 
limited brains”. We might reasonably demand that candidate systems pay heed to our 
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feebleness, by representing the world in a way that not only optimally balances 
simplicity and informativeness, but is such than approximations to it—which, given our 
limitations, may be all that we can ever hope to achieve—are also highly informative. 
Then the real problem with the phony fundamental constant has nothing to do with 
whether its actual value is mathematically identifiable in a simple way. Even if it were, 
the system that incorporated this value would fail the test we are considering: other, 
“nearby” systems, that got the value of the phony constant slightly wrong, would do 
so at the price of losing almost all of the extra informativeness the correct system 
attains by means of the constant. 
What I have just sketched seems to me a promising approach for the reductionist 
to take, although I have two lingering doubts. First, it seems clear that however this 
strategy is developed, it will end up making the importance that the practice of 
physics apparently places on the ICH/DH distinction seemed misguided; it remains 
to be seen whether the reductionist can supply a plausible “error theory” of this 
practice, or whether instead his position ends up looking too revisionist for comfort. 
Second, it seems to me easy to come up with examples of statements about the 
world that ought to be viewed as nomologically contingent, but that nevertheless 
contain quite a lot of information of great practical utility to us. I imagine, for 
example, that cosmologists would very much like to know the total mass of the 
universe—and that even approximate information about this mass would be 
enormously predictively and explanatorily valuable. But would their ability to squeeze 
useful predictive and explanatory information out of this knowledge do anything to 
show that facts about the total mass should be viewed as nomologically necessary? 
To me, it seems not—although I freely confess that I have nothing but intuition to 
go on here, and that these intuitions may have been corrupted by evil anti-
reductionist influences. 
It is clear what the debate needs next: a version of reductionism that gets much 
more serious than Lewis ever did both about what, precisely, the standards are for 
judging candidate systems, and about why—given the reductionist’s metaphysical 
commitments—those ought to be the standards; and a version or versions of anti-
reductionism that takes much more seriously the need to present a transparently 
clear conception of what the extra feature of the world is that goes beyond its 
distribution of perfectly natural magnitudes, and of how empirical evidence can be a 
reliable guide to this feature. In addition, the debate needs a shift in methodological 
priorities that places much less emphasis on intuitions about hypothetical cases, and 
much more emphasis on attending to the distinctive sort of work that a concept of 
“law of nature” performs in actual scientific practice. That is an approach that 
sensibly conceives of inquiry into metaphysics as continuous with scientific inquiry: 
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not because it is the scientists who really ought to be settling our metaphysical 
disputes for us (hah!), but rather because an understanding of the fundamental 
ontological structure of our world will be achieved, if at all, only by paying close 
attention to the structure of our scientific theories, and most importantly to the 
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